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"Such Unsightly Unions Could Never
Result in Holy Matrimony": Mixed-Status
Marriages in Seventeenth Century
Colonial Lima
Michelle A. McKinley*
This Article explores seventeenth-century annulment litigation involving mixed status couples in
which the free partner alleged mistaken identity-error de persona. While much research on
annulment addresses the ways that ecclesiastical courts regulated intimate relationships between
unequal couples at the behest of resistant elders, this Article examines the dissolution of marital ties by
the partners themselves. I examine one annulment suit at length in which the petitioner alleged error
de persona, using this suit to illustrate a common set of arguments deployed by litigants in the
ecclesiastical legal forum. The annulment cases provide a rich archival source for understanding the
diversity within urban slave communities in colonial Latin America and highlight the tensions over
race, honor, and status among members of the lower castes. More broadly, they illustrate how men and
women's experience of inequality affected their intimate relationships. Finally, the proceedings show
the more complex relationship between whiteness and freedom in a society with both significant
numbers of freed people of color, and those coded as white (given their ambiguous phenotype and
uncertain parentage) but who remained enslaved.
INTRODUCTION
On August 9, 1659, Juan Gonzilez de Miranda sought to annul his
marriage to Juana de Torres on the basis of mistaken identity. According
to Juan, he married Juana de Torres thinking that she was a free person-
the daughter of a noble, wealthy family from Panama City.1 In fact, Juana
de Torres was a domestic slave who had been brought to Lima from
Panama City with a Spanish family possessing rather dubious pretensions
to nobility. Juan was not the only litigant that year seeking an annulment
on the basis of mistaken identity. Out of twelve annulment suits brought
to the ecclesiastical court of Lima in 1659, four litigants similarly claimed
* Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. I wish to thank Carlos Aguirre, Carl
Bjerre, James Brundage, Burke Butler, Jessica Greene, Maria Emma Mannarelli, Karen Spalding,
Peggy Pascoe and Tania Triana for their helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Laura
Gutierrez Arbuhi and Melecio Tineo Mor6n of the Archivo Arzobispado de Lima for their assistance.
1. Archivo Arzobispado de Lima [hereinafter AAL]; Causas de Nulidad, 9 de agosto, 1659, Exp.
37. A transcript of the relevant portions of this archive is on file with the Yale Journal of Law & the
Humanities.
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to have married enslaved women "in error." One litigant, Pascual de
Duefias, contracted marriage with Maria de los Angeles believing that she
was a free mestiza of Indian and Spanish parentage. When Pascual tried to
assert his conjugal rights, he encountered staunch opposition from Maria's
owner.2 Although Pascual secured ecclesiastical support favoring his
conjugal rights, the property rights of Maria's owner encumbered his
petition. Granted only the right of weekend cohabitation vis-a-vis the
unlimited access to Maria that he desired, Pascual requested an annulment
resting his claim on notorious inequality and mistaken identity. Pascual, a
free mestizo, was located higher on the socio-racial scale than Maria, an
enslaved cuarterona de mulata.
Though these cases are three hundred and fifty years old, they spark the
curiosity of legal historians of slavery. In Iberian colonies, slaves were
legally entitled to marry and exercise their conjugal rights-notably on
weekends and other holy feast days. Owners could not impede the
marriages of their slaves-on the contrary, they were exhorted in
numerous royal edicts to both encourage and facilitate slave marriages.
However, the prevailing concern was that slaves marry other slaves.
Drawing on Roman law precedent, mixed status marriages among
enslaved women and free men were subject to regulation-and a great
degree of social disapprobation-because of the transmission of
enslavement to the offspring and limits on inheritance. Yet the archival
record demonstrates a high incidence of mixed status marriages, and these
cases show the "successful" ability to withhold or conceal one's enslaved
status. How did women like Juana and Maria conceal their enslavement
from the men they married? Race, phenotype, clothing, physical labor,
and work activities common to domestic servitude should have
immediately marked them as enslaved. Moreover, these are marital
claims: we presume that free men had other means of accessing sexual
favors of enslaved women that did not involve marriage. What were the
visible markers of enslavement that could be manipulated or subverted to
entrap naive suitors "blinded" by love? Or were these accusations of
mistaken identity a convenient excuse for astute husbands who sought to
annul their marriages: a difficult proceeding in an ecclesiastical court?
What can these cases tell us about the gendered behavioral codes, inter-
racial intimacies, and racial logics of the seventeenth century? These are
some of the questions that I seek to answer in this Article.
This Article examines seventeenth-century annulment litigation in
which one party alleged mistaken identity--error de persona. Although
much research on annulment addresses the ways that ecclesiastical courts
regulated intimate relationships between unequal couples at the behest of
2. AAL, Causas de Nulidad, 9 de septiembre, 1659, Exp. 37.
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resistant elders,3 this Article examines the dissolution of marital ties by the
partners themselves. Error de persona was typically alleged in two
situations. The first involved mixed status couples (i.e. slave and free) in
which the free partner claimed to have erroneously married an enslaved
person. In effect, the free partner accused his spouse of concealing her
enslaved status prior to marriage. The second category of cases alleged
racial fraud, in which one spouse claimed to have been duped into
marriage with a racially "inferior" partner on the basis of the partner's
ambiguous phenotype. In a slave-holding society where official racial
stratification coexisted with a high degree of miscegenation, many error
de persona cases alleged both racial fraud and status concealment. These
cases enable us to explore the complex relationship between whiteness and
freedom in a society with both significant numbers of freed people of
color, and those coded as white (given their indeterminate phenotype and
uncertain parentage) but who remained enslaved. More broadly, these
cases help us to understand how the gendered and racialized experience of
inequality and enslavement affected men and women's intimate
relationships.
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part One, I describe the procedural
steps involved in annulment or divorce litigation in ecclesiastical courts.
These proceedings unfolded in the Archbishopric court of Lima, Peru,
which exercised exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects of marriage
litigation in the colony and the independent republic until 1936. 4 The
3. The Church's role in regulating marriage in Latin America has been prolifically studied by
colonial historians, particularly those interested in issues of gender and family history. See, e.g.,
SILVIA ARROM, THE WOMEN OF MEXICO CITY, 1790-1857 (1985); MARiA EMMA MANNARELLI,
PECADOS PUBLICOS: LA ILEGITIMIDAD EN LIMA, SIGLO XVII (1993); VERENA MARTiNEZ-ALIER,
MARRIAGE, CLASS AND COLOUR IN NINETEENTH CENTURY CUBA: A STUDY OF RACIAL ATTITUDES
AND SEXUAL VALUES IN A SLAVE SOCIETY (1974); PATRICIA SEED, TO LOVE, HONOR AND OBEY IN
COLONIAL MEXICO: CONFLICTS OVER MARRIAGE CHOICE, 1574-1821 (1988); ANN TWiNAM, PUBLIC
LIVES, PRIVATE SECRETS: HONOR, SEXUALITY AND ILLEGITIMACY IN COLONIAL SPANISH AMERICA
(1999); Muriel Nazzari, Concubinage in Colonial Brazil: The Inequalities of Race, Class, and Gender,
21 J. FAM. HIST. 107 (1996); Susan Socolow, Acceptable Partners: Marriage Choice in Colonial
Argentina, 1778-1810, in SEXUALITY AND MARRIAGE IN COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA 209 (Asuncirn
Lavrin ed., 1992).
4. Ecclesiastical courts controlled marriage and family law throughout all of the Latin American
colonies until the nineteenth century Wars of Independence. However, in republican Peru, marriage
and divorce were matters that continued to be regulated by the Church until 1936-well over a century
after Peru declared independence in 1821. Secular marriage and the fight of divorce should have been
a natural outgrowth of liberal ideas, especially in light of the embrace of European codification and the
heady esprit de corps of the Bolivarist republics. But on the eve of independence, raging debates about
the secularization of marriage were critical in the struggle for power between Church and state. The
clergy proclaimed the Church's stabilizing force in the turbulent political climate that followed the
Wars of Independence, and in so doing, raised the specter of the domesticating potential of marriage in
national consolidation. By the late 1830s, the political fault lines had been drawn between liberals
(who espoused greater state control over the Church and the secularization of marriage) and
conservatives or traditionalists (who maintained that the Church should be controlled primarily from
Rome, that it should wield considerable temporal power, and that it should be unencumbered by state
interference). See HECTOR CORNEJO CHAVEZ, DERECHO FAMILIAR PERUANO (10th ed. 1999);
CARLOS RAMOS NO&EZ, EL CODIGO NAPOLE6NICO Y SU RECEPCI6N EN AMERICA LATINA (1997);
2010]
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Archbishopric Court also wielded jurisdiction over slave marriages and
adjudicated a broad gamut of legal claims brought by enslaved persons.5
As the entities charged with upholding social inequality, Church and state
were acutely concerned with the parity of the married couple.6 At the same
time, the cases sought dissolution of sacred marital ties that could not be
granted liberally if the institution of marriage were to retain its important
regulatory function. The stakes in these cases were high for slave and free
alike, as well as for the lawmakers who presided over them.
Part Two sets out the contours of early colonial Latin American racial
formations that developed in conjunction with Iberian concepts of slavery.
My discussion is limited to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when
such formations drew heavily on Iberian notions of blood purity (pureza
de sangre) rather than on scientific notions of "race" that emerged in the
nineteenth century. While both discourses are profoundly intertwined, my
focus here is on the idea that cultural and religious traits (which would
later be naturalized as "race") were transmissible and inheritable through
blood.7 In this Part, I disentangle sixteenth-century notions of caste (or
fractions of blood mixing) from racism's nineteenth-century roots, using
these cases to adumbrate the intersections of caste, race, and status.
8
Peter Guardino & Charles Walker, The State, Society and Politics in Peru and Mexico in the Late
Colonial and Early Republican Periods, 37 LATIN AM. PERSP. 10 (1992); David Guillet, Customary
Law and the Nationalist Project in Spain and Peru, 85 HtsP. AM. HIST. REv. 81 (2005); Frederick
Pike, Church and State in Peru and Chile since 1840: A Study in Contrasts, 73 AM. HIST. REV. 30
(1967).
5. MARIBEL ARRELUCEA BARRANTES, REPLEANTANDO LA ESCLAVITUD: ESTUDIOS DE
ETNICIDAD Y GENERO EN LIMA BORB6NICO (2009); BERNARD LAVALLt, AMOR Y OPRESION EN LOS
ANDES COLONIALES (2001); JoSt RAM6N JOUVE MARTIN, ESCLAVOS DE LA CIUDAD LETRADA:
ESCLAVITUD, ESCRITURA Y COLONIALISMO EN LIMA, 1650-1700 (2005); Michelle McKinley,
Fractional Freedoms: Slavery, Legal Agency and Ecclesiastical Courts in Colonial Lima, 1593-1689,
28 LAW & HIST. REV. 3 (2010).
6. The formal position of the Church on parity between marital partners was not universally
shared or uniformly enforced. Indeed, in the pre-Pragmatic period, many priests upheld matrimonial
promises between couples of unequal status over the objection of parents and elders. See SEED, supra
note 3; Eduardo Saguier, Church and State in Buenos Aires in the Seventeenth Century, 26 J. CHURCH
& STATE 491 (1984); Socolow, supra note 3.
7. On the imbrication of both blood purity and scientific racism on evolving ideas of race in
Mexico, see MARIA ELENA MARTNEZ, GENEALOGICAL FICTIONS: LIMPIEZA DE SANGRE, RELIGION,
AND GENDER IN COLONIAL MEXICO (2008). Arguably the naturalists of the Aquinian persuasion used
"reason" and "rationality" rather than "race" to determine the moral or natural status of barbarians
within Christendom. Centuries later, positivists departed fi-om the universalist strand in the natural law
to determine attributes of intellect, beauty, culture, and history, bestowing the natural status of rulers
and ruled on the basis of "scientific evidence." Anthony Pagden suggests that the early period of
European expansion into the Americas deepened the divisions within the paradigm of moral universal
humanism, and that later periods of imperial expansion into Africa, Asia and the Pacific provided the
opportunity for that moral paradigm to be recast scientifically according to positivist science in the
imperial laboratories. ANTHONY PAGDEN, THE FALL OF NATURAL MAN (1982).
8. Using the Arendtian notion of "race thinking," historian Irene Silverblatt remarks: "Race
thinking helps us understand how race and caste might chameleonlike slip in and out of one another,
how a relatively innocent category (like color) could become virulent; how politically defined
differences (like nationality) could so easily become inheritable traits." See Irene Silverblatt, Modem
Inquisitions, in IMPERIAL FORMATIONS 275, 283 (Ann Stoler, Carole McGranahan & Peter Perdue
[Vol. 22:217
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In Part Three, I consider the impact of vice-regal and ecclesiastical
policies on mixed status marriage and inter-ethnic concubinage, and
compare these official policies with evidence of daily practice gleaned
from both parish records and ecclesiastical litigation.9 In this vein, Part
Four examines one annulment suit in detail, using this suit to illustrate a
common set of arguments deployed by litigants in error de persona cases
in the ecclesiastical courts. My primary sources include the complete court
record: the complaint, the rebuttal, the witness statements, the cross-
complaints and the final judgment. This proceeding is drawn exclusively
from an archived collection of over 1,500 annulment and divorce
proceedings brought between 1650-1700 housed at the Archbishopric of
Lima. In concentrating on this time period, I have been able to rely on the
data analyzed by other colonial historians, which indicate an increased
trend in divorce and annulment litigation in the latter half of the
seventeenth century. 10 It is no coincidence that these cases of marital
fraud reach their apogee during a time of rapid demographic growth."
eds., 2007).
9. We can appreciate the social and emotional bonds forged by inter-ethnic couples and
communities by consulting parish records of baptisms, betrothals, concubinage accusations, marriage
petitions and testamentary bequests. See JESUS COSAMAL6N AGUILAR, INDIOS DETRAS DE LA
MURALLA, MATRIMONIOS INDIGENAS Y CONVIVENCIA INTER-RACIAL EN SANTA ANA, LIMA, 1795-
1820 (1999), using marriage records from Santa Ana to trace inter-ethnic marriage between blacks and
indigenous migrants in the late colonial period. For a similar argument regarding plebeian life in
seventeenth-century Mexico City, see R. DOUGLAS COPE, THE LIMITS OF RACIAL DOMINATION:
PLEBEIAN SOCIETY IN COLONIAL MEXICO CITY, 1660-1720 (1994). On the use of legal archives to
reconstruct the life histories of slaves, see Mariza Soarez et al., Slavery in Ecclesiastical Archives, 86
HtSP. Am. HIST. REV. 337 (2005-2006).
10. For a quantitative analysis of divorce and annulment proceedings brought between 1650-
1700, see LAVALL, supra note 5, at 28-30.
11. Census figures for 1600 recorded an urban population of 14,262 inhabitants. Fourteen years
later, the population registered 25,165. The following chart is reproduced from the Padron de los
Indios de Lima, commissioned by Viceroy Montesclaros in 1613.
Poblaci6n de Lima en 1614
Varones Mujeres (women) %
Espafioles 5,271 4,359 38.9
Religiosos (clerics) 894 826 6.9
Negros 4,529 5,857 41.9
Mulatos 326 418 3.o
Indios 1,116 862 7.9
Mestizos 97 95 0.8
Recogidos en el Hospital 79
de la Caridad
Recogidas en las 13
Divorciadas II
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Steady migration from Seville, Lisbon, Genoa, Manila, the Canaries,
Cape Verde, as well as increased movement between colonial sites-New
Spain, Panama City, Nicaragua, Cartagena, Arica, Tucumdn, and
Santiago-introduced new bodies unmoored from metropolitan gendered
and racialized orders. These migrations created unprecedented
opportunities and pressures for intimate relationships within the most
prominent South American city of the Spanish Empire. As Nancy van
Deusen writes,
The constant mobility deeply affected the nature of
marital relations and kinship ties. In the seventeenth
century, such demographic inconstancy was also reflected
in the dramatic increase in the number of marital litigation
suits, as well as in the upsurge of divorce petitions, which
tripled, and annulment requests. 
1 2
In the concluding section, I reflect upon the important insights contained
in these records for legal scholars of race, slavery, and gender in domestic
relations.
Before going further, it is worth situating this work within contemporary
trends in slavery studies, legal anthropology and legal history. For
historians of slavery-particularly in the last two decades-the impulse
has been to identify apertures for freedom and agency, while accounting
for the entrenched structural constraints of human bondage. Legal records
give us literal evidence of volition, agency and voice among enslaved
Criadas en los Conventos 425
(orphans raised in
convents)
Source: MAURO ESCOBAR GAMBOA, PADR6N DE LOS INDIOS DE LIMA EN 1613 (Univ. of San Marcos
Press, 1968).
Numerically, the largest group was blacks (negros), followed closely by the white (espahol)
population. The remaining groups were split almost evenly between freed and enslaved blacks, castas,
and a small percentage of urban Indians. Of course, the population increase in Lima due to forced and
voluntary migration does not account for the population decline of the indigenous population on the
coast. Indigenous communities experienced waves of decimation through disease and removal
throughout the sixteenth century, but the hardest hit communities in terms of demographic decline
were coastal chieftaincies. See CARLOS CONTRERAS & MARCOS CuETA, HISTORIA DEL PERO
CONTEMPORANEO (2004); PETER KLAREN, NACI6N Y ESTADO EN LA HISTORIA DEL PERU (2004). In
addition to the decimation of the coastal indigenous communities, the Spaniards adopted a method of
indirect rule that physically uprooted indigenous peoples into reducciones (nucleated settlements or
"Indian towns"), where they were accorded limited self-governance with distinct tributary obligations
and privileges. Notably, indigenous communities were to be protected from the vice, encroachment,
and predation of Spaniards and blacks. In exchange for this protection, indigenous peoples remained
quintessential colonial subjects-perpetually childlike, and in need of religious and moral education.
Reducciones were sites of religious indoctrination, where through proper exposure and education,
indigenous peoples would learn the arts of enlightened government and Christian morality. See, e.g.,
FELIPE GUAMAN POMA DE AYALA, THE FIRST NEW CHRONICLE AND GOOD GOVERNMENT (David L.
Frye trans., Hackett 2006) (1613). For a critical analysis of the "separate" republics, see KAREN
SPALDING, HUAROCHIRi: AN ANDEAN SOCIETY UNDER INCA AND SPANISH RULE (1984).
12. Nancy van Deusen, Determining the Boundaries of Virtue: The Discourse of Recogimiento
Among Women in Seventeenth-Century Lima, 22 J. FAMILY HIST. 373, 375 (1997).
[Vol. 22:217
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subjects. The records offer a unique view of the intersections of caste,
freedom, class, and gender, and help us to understand how litigants with
differential access to power experienced slavery, patriarchy, and racialized
inequality. 3 Legal records however, are not complete. Neither are they
unmediated "pure" texts. By its very nature, litigation is an aggressive act
in which one party contests (and seeks to vanquish) the claim of the
opposing party. Perhaps even more importantly, divorce and annulment
litigation render a particularly rancorous view of affective life. As John
Noonan reminds us, legal historians, like pathologists, see the ravages of a
diseased body rather than a healthy specimen when we study marriage
through the lens of divorce. 4 Countless couples no doubt sustained robust,
loving domestic relationships, having no reason to come under the
purview of the court-thereby eluding our retrospective inquisitions. This
is one of the conundrums of family history when reconstructed through
court records: the law tells us very little about the lived realities of
everyday domestic life. Legal action gives us evidence of family life at the
moment of rupture, rather than intuitively guiding us through the joys and
travails of the union itself. Despite the numerous edicts issued proscribing
inter-ethnic marriage and concubinage that emanated from Castile,15 we
are justifiably suspicious about the relevance of these laws to people's
behavior. Indeed, demographic data assiduously collected throughout the
colonial period demonstrate convincingly that the deterrent effects of these
edicts on inter-caste marriage, mixed-status marriage, and concubinary
unions were negligible. In what sense, then, is law reflective of social
reality?16
13. I prefer to use the term "litigants with differential access to power" rather than subaltern
litigants. Subaltemity, when used in a uni-dimensional, descriptive way to denote plebeian status,
flattens out other aspects of power based on class, caste and gender that is the underlying concern of
this article. Subalternity also arose out of critical South Asian post-colonial studies: a context that
markedly ignored Latin America by positing the Orient and primarily the British colonies as Europe's
Other. As such, subalternity has a prickly history in Latin American intellectual history. See, e.g.,
Florencia Mallon, The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives from Latin American
History, 99 AM. HIST. REV. 1491 (1994). For a critical review of Said's Occidentalism and the imperial
focus of subaltern studies, see WALTER MIGNOLO, LOCAL THINKING/GLOBAL DESIGNS:
COLONIALITY, SUBALTERN KNOWLEDGE, AND BORDER THINKING (2000).
14. JOHN NOONAN, POWER TO DISSOLVE: LAWYERS AND MARRIAGES IN THE COURTS OF THE
ROMAN CURIA x (1972).
15. See RICHARD KONETZKE, COLECCION DE DOCUMENTOS PARA LA HISTORIA DE LA
FORMACION SOCIAL DE HISPANOAMtRICA, 1493-1810 (1958).
16. The genealogy of "microhistory," and history "written from below" vis-A-vis "history of the
law," gives the reader a set of guideposts as to the development of interdisciplinary methods in legal
studies in Latin America. As such, it is worth laying out the contours of its intellectual debates. On
micro-history, see Carlo Ginzburg, Microhistory: Two or Three Things That I Know About It, 20
CRITICAL INQUIRY 10 (1993). Eminent twentieth-century historians of the law focused almost
exclusively on the promulgation of written codes, royal decrees, and viceregal proclamations, linking
the redaction of law to the consolidation of state power. Exemplars of this compendious approach to
legal history include RAFAEL ALTAMIRA, TECNICA DE INVESTIGACI6N EN LA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO
INDIANO (1939); JORGE BASAADRE, HISTORIA DEL DERECHO PERUANO (1937); LOS REGIDORES
PERPETUOS DEL CABILDO DE LIMA 1535-1821: CRONICA Y ESTUDIO DE UN GRUPO DE GESTION
2010]
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The degree to which law is reflective of social reality is a vexed
question in law and society studies, and is particularly salient in the
dialogues between historians and anthropologists who use legal documents
as a source of cultural critique. 7 Despite the time-honored status of
archival research, the lively debate between ethnographers and historians
about the writing of history and culture has encouraged new thinking
about the sources we choose, the interpretive methods we adopt, and the
privileging of certain histories in national narratives. Ethnographers with
a longer period of reflection about methods and the writing of "culture"
have challenged historians to question the double discourses in the
archive. Confined to the archival record, the historian tries to make sense
of the documents before her by juxtaposing these lawsuits with the
jurisprudential context in which they were decided. But as anthropologists
(1956); KONETZKE, supra note 15; GUILLERMO LOHMANN VILLENA, FRANCISCO DE TOLEDO:
DISPOSICIONES GUBERNATIVAS PARA EL VIRREINATO DEL PERO, 1569-1574 (1986); SILVIO ZAVALA,
NEW VIEWPOINTS ON THE SPANISH COLONIZAION OF AMERICA (1943). Slavery, for example, was
studied from the perspective of legal codes and royal decrees like the 1789 Cddigo Carolino or the
Code Noir of the Francophone colonies. See, e.g., JAVIER MALAG6N BARCELO, EL C6DIGO NEGRO
CAROLINO (1974). In short, Latin American legal studies was guided by formalism and textual fidelity.
When scholars looked outside of the codes, their observations were accompanied by handwringing
over the inefficiency and corruption of legal institutions, and the tenuous reach of the law. On the
formalist legal framework, see Jorge Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 41 (2003). The infamous gap or breach between statutory laws and individual social action had
been an almost pathological point of reference for all that ailed Latin American judicial systems. The
surge of interdisciplinary interest that had invigorated legal scholars to examine law as a critical site of
contestation appeared in the late 1960s. While still inescapably legocentric, the "Law and
Development" movement brought the energies and insights of the US law and society movement to
the study of Latin American legal institutions and political processes. See LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA (Kenneth Karst & Keith Rosenn eds., 1975); David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory
of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1 (1972). These cross-
fertilizations in Latin American legal studies were nourished by writings in feminist, cultural and
literary studies, and political and legal anthropology, that increasingly looked to law as a performative
site that was "kinda-subversive-kinda-hegemonic." On the law as an agent of hegemonic and
traditionalist forces, see CONTESTED STATES: LAW, HEGEMONY AND RESISTANCE (AFTER THE LAW)
(Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan Hirsch eds., 1994); HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY (June Starr & Jane Collier eds., 1989); LAW IN CULTURE
AND SOCIETY (Laura Nader ed., 1997); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN:
LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990); SALLY FALK MOORE, SOCIAL
FACTS AND FABRICATIONS: "CUSTOMARY" LAW ON KILIMANJARO 1880-1980 (1986). Concurrently,
social historians and new social movement theorists-particularly those studying gender-based and
peasant (campesino) or identity-based mobilizations, de-centered the state and its institutions as the
object of analysis to account for the complex negotiations that less powerful actors engaged in through
transnational legal action. See, e.g., THE MAKING OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA:
IDENTITY, STRATEGY AND DEMOCRACY (Arturo Escobar & Sonia Alvarez eds., 1992). The new focus
was not on blaming the infamous gap between law and individual action (colloquially referred to as
entre el hecho y el derecho). Rather, the concern was to explore how that gap enabled a host of quasi-
rebellious acts and self-efficacy, ranging from individual innovation and contumacy, to circumspect
resistance. For the canonical study on bottom-up protest and resistance, see JAMES SCOTT, WEAPONS
OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (1985).
17. On the methodological challenges of reconstructing cultural transformation from legal
archives, see Bill Maurer, The Cultural Power of Law? Conjunctive Readings, 38 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
843 (2004). See also Kunal Parker, Thinking Inside the Box: A Historian Among the Anthropologists,
38 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 851 (2004) (critiquing historians' document fetishism and their corresponding
theoretical naivet6).
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remind us, what people say they ought to do and what people actually do
is often very different. The anthropologist attempts to understand a society
or culture on its own terms through firsthand interpretations of the
experiences of those immersed within the particular culture under the
ethnographic gaze. In the quest to discern mentalits, historians parse
through hundreds of folios of centuries-old texts on the lookout for
aberrations and loopholes, curious silences, and disjunctures between the
"should" and the "did."' 8 Or stated more elegantly: we now read texts
attuned to the disconnect between the ideal and the real.
Another related drawback to relying on litigation for social history is
that courts are one venue in which less powerful subjects seek resolution
of their complaints by powerful actors.' 9 As such, litigants necessarily
conform to official/elite discourses to prevail in their cases, even when
their daily experiences show otherwise. Thus, our inquiry into these cases
of marital fraud could be informed by at least two different considerations.
The first would be to query whether those seeking annulment based on
marital fraud really endorsed the racial hierarchies that they subsequently
proclaimed in court. But it becomes a daunting task to deduce motivation
from text, given what we know about notarial ventriloquism, "hidden
transcripts" and public scripts. Perhaps one of the most valuable insights
of legal realism is that laws are mobilized for ends that are far different
than those for which they were implemented. Beyond the concerns of
lawmakers, the cases require us to discern the sentiments of the petitioners
themselves-sentiments as powerful as desire, hatred, ambition, envy, and
perhaps love. Another alternative is to question whether these frequent
violations of the racial order imperiled the viability of the order itself. In
the cases of racial and status fraud considered here, courts were a principal
forum for the contestation and manipulation of colonial identities and
subjectivities. The interpellation of law and race is particularly salient in
the ecclesiastical courts because it was the Church that assumed the
enumerative function of both assigning "race" at birth, and adjudicating
racial fraud claims in its courts.
18. I can think of no better meditation on the historian's obsessive-compulsive condition to
"know" the past than Carolyn Steedman's 'Something She Called a Fever': Michelet, Derrida, and
Dust, in DUST: THE ARCHIVE AND CULTURAL HISTORY 17 (2003).
19. For an insightful historical review of the conformity of legal language, see Natalie Zemon
Davis's analysis of"pardon tales" in sixteenth-century France. Pardon tales were appeals to the Crown
for clemency in remission proceedings. As Davis writes, few if any prisoners would have used the
remission process to express resistance, even if their acts clearly showed resistance to sixteenth-
century ideals of gendered behavior. According to Davis, "Those in positions of power-most notably
the King-were not presented with alternatives to their preferred interpretation of women's lives.
Each of the supplicants repented-and their penance simultaneously reflected and reaffirmed the
values of the dominant society at the time." NATALIE ZEMON DAVIS, FICTION IN THE ARCHIVES:
PARDON TALES AND THEIR TELLERS IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 15 (1987). These remission
tales also conformed to sixteenth-century French literary and oral traditions, implying that the
supplicant, the legal community and the royal court were conversant with similar narrative styles.
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In sum, though partial and imperfect, the legal record yields invaluable
insights about past inter-ethnic intimacies. These cases invariably show us
how slaves, free blacks, Europeans, indigenous mestizos, 20 and castas
fought, loved, and procreated up, down, and across the racial scale. The
annulment cases provide a rich archival source for understanding the
diversity within urban slave communities in colonial Latin America, and
highlight the tensions over race, honor, and status among members of the
lower castes. Contrary to the more familiar North American experience,
this is not a study about the invocation of state force to police inter-racial
relationships. This is about self-regulation of racial borders: when
individuals threatened by the effacement of those borders called on the
law to reinstate racial hierarchies.
PART ONE: ANNULMENT AND DIVORCE IN ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS
Couples seeking to dissolve their marriages in an ecclesiastical court
generally requested an annulment as the preferred option. In the (likely)
event that the annulment petition was denied, the petitioner alternatively
requested an ecclesiastical divorce in the initial pleading. Under canon
law, ecclesiastical divorce-quoad thorum et mensam---could be granted
on the grounds of heresy, mutual decision to enter religious orders,
adultery, and sevicia--cruel and inhuman punishment.21 Ecclesiastical
divorce simply meant that the court authorized a permanent separation;
neither spouse was free to remarry. Conversely, annulment severed all
bonds between the couple, restoring each party to the original prenuptial
state. Annulment was a more difficult legal pursuit in the ecclesiastical
courts. Given the Iberian ideal of marital parity, inequality between
married couples was also a permissible ground for annulment. "Race,"
caste, and economic disparity in family status were generally proffered as
evidence of marital inequality. In the case of complex marriage
negotiations between socially unequal families, resistant elders could
allege error de persona to annul a prenuptial contract or a clandestine
22marriage.
Ton-is Sdnchez, an eminent seventeenth-century canonist, divided the
law of error into categories of personae, conditionis, fortunae, qualitatis.
According to Sdinchez:
Error is of four kinds. First, [error] of person, when one
20. On indigenous hybridity, see Marisol de la Cadena's insightful book, INDIGENOUS MESTIZOS:
THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CULTURE IN CUZCO, PERU, 1919-1991 (2000).
21. X [= Liber Extra = Decretales Gregorii IX] 4.19.5 Ex litteris tuis, Clement InI (1188-1191); JL
16645 and X 4.19.7 Quanto te, Innocent Il, 1 May 1199; Potthast 684.
22. See TWINAM, supra note 3; Muriel Nazzarri, Sex/Gender Arrangements and the Reproduction
of Class in the Latin American Past, in GENDER POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA: DEBATES IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 134 (Elizabeth Dore ed., 1997).
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person is taken for another. Second, [error] of servile
condition, when a free man marries with someone he
supposes is free and she really is a servant. Third, [error]
of quality, when he believes he is marrying a beautiful
noble virgin and she is actually misshapen, common, and
corrupt. Lastly, [error] of fortune, when he thinks she is
rich and she is really a pauper. This can be called [error]
of quality, since he was mistaken only about the quality of
her wealth.23
Parents or guardians of the higher status family typically raised these
objections at the betrothal or prenuptial stage. But in the annulment
petitions examined here, the higher status partner raised the objections
after the marriage had occurred. Indeed, our first petitioner, Juan
Gonzales de Miranda, sought an annulment six years after his marriage to
Juana de Torres, having fathered two children with her. The credibility of
Juan's claim is not of interest here-it was unlikely that he would have
been ignorant about his wife's status, especially when Juana pointed out in
her rebuttal that Juan had lived at her owner's house continuously
throughout their marriage.24 Nonetheless, many petitioners brought error
de persona claims after celebrating marriages of considerable duration. 25
PART Two: IBERIAN RACIAL FORMATIONS IN COLONIAL CONTEXTS
Many years ago, Frank Tannenbaum called our attention to the
importance of slave law in creating distinct racial hierarchies and identities
in the Americas. 6 Indeed, it is difficult to understand the legal rationale
23. TOMAS SANcHEz, 2 DE SANCTO MATRIMONII SACRAMENTO DISPUTATIONUM, TOMI TRES 69
(1625) ("[Qjuadruplicem esse errorem. Primum personae, cum una persona pro alia supponitur. 11
conditionis servilis, cum contrahens liber existimat contrahere cum libera et est ancilla. III Qualitatis,
cum credit se contrahere cum pulchra, nobili virgine et est deformis, plebeia, corrupta. Ultimum
fortunae, cum putatur dives et est pauper. Qui error palest dici qualitatis. Cum tunc in qualitate
divitiarum sola errettur."). See also Raymond de Penyafort, SUMMA ON MARRIAGE 30 (Pierre Payer
trans., 2005) (a widely cited canonical legal source on error).
24. AAL, supra note 1, 9 de agosto, 1659, Juana de Torres responde al escrito y demanda de
nulidad de matrimonio puesta por Juan G6nzalez de Miranda. After the prosecutor confronted Juan
with his wife's testimony, Juan admitted that someone had advised him that if he wanted to get out of
his marriage, he should go to court and allege error de persona. Clearly, it was becoming well known
among unhappy spouses in mixed-status and inter-racial unions that error de persona was a legal basis
for annulment.
25. Strictly speaking, the litigants should have alleged error de condici6n, although they
uniformly refer to error de persona. When inequality of condition was the basis of annulment,
litigants sometimes referred to their spouse's "defective condition of slavery (en su defecto de ser
esclavo)."
26. For a review of the civil law tradition and Latin American slavery and emancipation, see
FRANK TANNENBAUM, SLAVE AND CITIZEN: THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAS (1946). Enormous
intellectual effort has been devoted to either disproving or supporting Tannenbaum's thesis. In brief,
Tannenbaum asserted that the influence of Roman law upon the Siete Partidas, combined with the
pervasive authority of the Catholic Church gave rise to a system of slavery more benign than the
common-law or the "Virginia" variant that prevailed in the North American colonies. Tannenbaum
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for error de persona cases without a clear idea about race and calidad that
developed in tandem with the consolidation of Iberian slavery in Latin
America. 27  Legal categories that developed in a slave holding society
wherein enslavement was increasingly justified on "racial" attributes
would shape the way that peoples of the Americas thought about racial
stratification. 28 Ideas about race were inextricable from the ideas that
legitimated the enslavement of Africans and Moors and exempted
indigenous peoples from servitude. But enslavement was not neatly
coterminous with "race," lineage, status or condition. Confusion
invariably arose with commingled populations of free, freed, runaway,
yanaconas,29 indentured, apprenticed, servile, poor, enslaved, and noble.
Impoverished Spaniards (or those with negligible hidalgo status) married
free and enslaved black women, as well as indigenous noblewomen.30
Runaway slaves sought refuge in indigenous communities, founding
families therein. Not surprisingly, their offspring created more anomalies
for apportioning rights, privileges and duties on the basis of race.3
argued (controversially) that that the civil law tradition endowed slaves with both a legal and moral
personality. He also argued (less controversially) that the civil law created greater paths to
manumission than the common law. On the Tannenbaum thesis, see HERBERT KLEIN, SLAVERY IN THE
AMERICAS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF VIRGINIA AND CUBA (1967); Forum: What Can Frank
Tannenbaum Teach us About the Law of Slavery?, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. (2004). For a materialist
criticism of the Tannenbaum thesis, see Eugene Genovese, Materialism and Idealism in the History of
Negro Slavery in the Americas, in SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 238 (Laura Foner & Eugene
Genovese eds., 1969). For a critique of Tannenbaum's thesis applied to civil law jurisdictions in the
United States, see David Rankin, The Tannenbaum Thesis Reconsidered: Slavery and Race Relations
in Antebellum Louisiana, 18 S. STUD. 5 (1979).
27. The primary legal framework into which slaves were assimilated arose out of the legal status
of holy war captives, not human chattel. See James Muldoon, Papal Responsibility for the Infidel:
Another Look at Alexander V's Inter Caetera, 64 CATH. HIST. REV. 168 (1978). Commercial slavery
became admissible only by dint of the imperative of conversion and the saving of infidel souls.
Indeed, commercial slavery rested on tenuous legal grounds throughout the early modern and early
colonial period (ca. 1441-1650s), rendering the Church ever vigilant in ensuring the authenticity of the
imperial soul-saving mandate. See Kenneth Pennington, Bartolomd de las Casas and the Tradition of
Medieval Law, 39 CHURCH HIST. 149, 155-56 (1970). For the sixteenth century, the primary concern
of all royal edicts was the Christianization of the enslaved population brought from West Africa.
Concerted rhetorical effort went into ensuring the baptism of slaves at the point of embarkation and
disembarkation in the New World. For a detailed review of the Church's effort at soul saving, see
Vincent Franklin, Alonso de Sandoval and the Jesuit Conception of the Negro, 58 J. NEGRO HIST. 349
(1973). As George Fredrickson recently commented, the Spaniards were more averse to making slaves
than buying them. See GEORGE FREDRICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 38 (2002). According to
Fredrickson, African slavery differed from indigenous slavery "primarily from the differing legal
status of conquered peoples and those obtained as merchandise from areas outside of Spanish
jurisdiction." Id.
28. Robert Cottrol, The Long Lingering Shadow: Law, Liberalism, and Cultures of Racial
Hierarchy and Identity in the Americas, 16 TULANE L. REV. 11 (2001).
29. Yanaconas were mobile indigenous laborers without claims to land, whose tenancy bore close
resemblance to sharecropping arrangements on large estates. See JOSE MATOS MAR, ERASMO MUiKos,
YANACON DE VALLE DE CHANCAY (1974).
30. On the sexual unions between conquistadors and Inca noblewomen, see KAREN POWERS,
WOMEN IN THE CRUCIBLE OF CONQUEST: THE GENDERED GENESIS OF SPANISH AMERICAN SOCIETY,
1500-1600 (2005).
31. It bears repeating that "race" signified differences as they were defined in religious and
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As shown in the following list, children of mixed European, indigenous
and African ancestry (known as castas) were classified in sixteen
categories. This enumerative schema also established the legal and social
distinctions that formed the basis of the colonial caste system. 32
9 espafiol + negra = mulato
* mulato + espafiola = tercer6n
* tercer6n + espafiola = quarter6n
* quarter6n + espafiola = quinter6n
* quinter6n + espafiola = blanco or espafiol comiin
* negro + mulata = zambo
* zambo + mulata = zambaigo
* zambaigo + mulata = t~nte en el aire
* tdnte en el aire + mulata = salta atrds
* espafiol + india = mestizo
* mestizo + india = cholo
* cholo + india = trnte en el aire
* tdnte en el aire + india = salta atrds
Sindio + negra - chino
* chino + negra = rechino/criollo
• criollo + negra = torna atrds
33
Of course, none of these enumerations were "value free, objective
descriptions of phenotype" or complexion.34 (One might ask when
enumerations have ever been neutral--despite the claim that census data
merely document, not create, race.) Although the list is silent with regard
to status, exogamous sexual unions generally occurred outside of
marriage. Casta was thus a racialized designation vested with the
opprobrium of illegitimacy and lower social status. Granted, this reflects
an elite perspective, but it undoubtedly influenced the way castas viewed
cultural terms. During the sixteenth century, the legitimacy of slavery was grounded in the Curse of
Ham-the biblical rationale for enslavement as the original sin of Africans, fused with Aristotelian
thoughts of natural slavery and the possession and presence of Mediterranean slaves that were a
constant feature of Iberian life. These were largely justifications that reflected the overall imperative of
economic growth through the importation of a large non-native workforce, but I am particularly
interested in the social mutation of the previous category of "slave" as a captive of war to an object of
commerce as ideas of race and blood mixing were negotiated in the Americas.
32. David Cahill, Colour By Numbers: Racial and Ethnic Categories in the Viceroyalty of Peru,
1532-1824, 26 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 325, 341-42 (1994).
33. Id. at 339. This list is representative of many of the caste classification systems of the period
known as the sistema de castas. The charts from New Spain generally contain more categories. Id. at
340. Note that according to this enumerative scheme, it is the higher status male who reproduces
offspring with a "racially inferior" female.
34. Id. at 329. For a detailed review of the plasticity of census taking among rural indigenous
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themselves. Caste emerged as a way of thinking about "blood mixing"
(vis-d-vis an ideal of blood purity) that articulated ideas of inequality
commonly shared by priests, journalists, treatise writers, judges,
prosecutors, and the colonial society. In other words, caste was not
merely a designation of blood lineage-it was indicative of, and
encompassed one's status, descent, occupation, condition at birth, and
networks of patronage. Caste categories were negotiable both in terms of
the law and the broader community, but they were closely monitored and
upheld by the parties themselves.
Despairing of the limited utility of the terms "race" and "caste" as ways
of understanding the complex colonial categories of identity, some
scholars have adopted the term calidad to "capture the multiple factors
beyond phenotype (for example occupation, reputation, language abilities,
dress) that qualified a straightforward racial classification."35 Similarly, I
use calidad as a barometer to measure and situate one's social location that
was not exclusively contingent on elite notions of identity. Calidad
referred to a person's general worth: one's prestige, family connections,
reputation, pure blood lineage, and honor. Caste was a factor of one's
calidad, but this also invoked a constellation of upbringing, appearance,
virtue, seclusion, and religious devotion. Calidad, like caste, was heavily
susceptible to social perception and could change over time as people
amassed greater prestige and improved their economic position. (It also
could be demoted as people fell on hard times.) Although we typically
associate calidad with the noble classes, reputation, status, and honor were
of course important among plebeians.36 Plebeian, enslaved, and lower-
caste men and women also used calidad to dissolve their marital bonds.3 7
Consequently, the use of calidad became invested with different socio-
racial meanings when couples from the lower social strata (castas, slaves,
plebeians) sought court intervention to dissolve their marriages.
The Crown explicitly prohibited marriages between certain groups,
particularly between blacks and Indians. Colonial authorities were deeply
concerned about relations between African slaves and indigenous
populations (perhaps even more so than African-Spaniard relationships)
35. IMPERIAL SUBJECTS: RACE AND IDENTITY IN COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA II (Andrew Fisher
& Matthew D. O'Hara eds., 2009).
36. See COPE, supra note 9; WINTHROP WRIGHT, CAFE CON LECHE: RACE, CLASS AND NATIONAL
IMAGE IN VENEZUELA (1990); THE FACES OF HONOR: SEX, SHAME AND VIOLENCE IN COLONIAL
LATIN AMERICA (Lyman Johnson & Sonya Lipsett-Rivera eds., 1998).
37. Although I examine annulment suits that were brought by free men, the archival records
indicate that divorce and annulment were legal proceedings principally undertaken by women of lower
social status. Bernard Lavalld notes that out of 927 divorce suits for the years 1650 to 1700, a mere 35
petitions were brought by men. LAVALLE, supra note 5, at 28. In the annulment petitions filed in the
same period, men brought 103 suits out of 605. Id. at 30. Enslaved and low-status women's
annulment claims were based overwhelmingly on their lack of consent-particularly when forced into
marriage with undesirable partners by their owners, guardians or parents.
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and they took pains to prevent sexual relationships between enslaved men
and indigenous women.38 Indeed, the Crown condemned mixed status
unions as "unsightly," (ayuntamientosfeos), doubting whether they could
be endowed with the legal status of holy matrimony. But extensive
miscegenation (largely through concubinary unions) urged the
incorporation of hybrid mestizo categories into taxonomies of caste that
retained core features of Iberian blood purity while accommodating mixed
offspring. Without belaboring the point unduly, miscegenation
contravened the Iberian system of blood purity upon which status and
privilege were apportioned. Lawmakers responded to this breach by
simultaneously accommodating and relegating "mixed-race" offspring to
the lower castes.39 Thus, lawmakers admitted the existence of mixed-race
offspring, but circumscribed their opportunities for upward mobility.
In seventeenth-century Lima, mixed-status and inter-racial unions
unfolded in a racial system where whitening (blanqueamiento) became
critical to social ascendancy. However maligned inter-ethnic unions were
by lawmakers and the clergy, blood purity was an impractical means of
allocating privilege in the Americas. Those who were nearly white-and
thus closest to white privilege-were precisely those who were the most
compromised in terms of blood purity. 0 There is no neat correlation
between peninsular concepts of racial purity and colonial realities of social
ascendancy through whitening. Nevertheless, we see numerous laws
inveighing against inter-ethnic unions juxtaposed with the administrative
recognition of increasingly complex fractions of caste.4 Presuming that
38. See FREDERICK BOWSER, THE AFRICAN SLAVE IN COLONIAL PERU, 1524-1650, at 153(1974).
According to Bowser's analysis of early colonial sanctions, the punishment for sexual relations
between African men and indigenous women was castration. In the case of sexual relations between
African women and indigenous men, the punishment was 100 lashes for the first conviction. If there
was a second conviction, African women's ears were to be cut off. Free persons of color of both sexes
faced the lash on the first offence and exile on the second.
39. Entry into religious orders, universities, or upper level military administrative posts was
prohibited for those of illegitimate parentage, the lower castes, and Indians. When economic pressures
created needs for additional sources of revenue, wealthy castas could appeal to the crown for a royal
dispensation of honorary whiteness. For an interesting case of the purchase of whiteness, see James
King, The Case of Jose Ponciano de Ayarza: A Document on Gracias al Sacar, 31 HiSP. AM. HIST.
REV. 640-7 (1951); see also Ann Twinam, Purchasing Whiteness: Conversations on the Essence of
Pardo-ness and Mulato-ness at the End of Empire, in IMPERIAL SUBJECTS, supra note 35, at 141-66,
for a detailed study on Gracias al Sacar petitions.
40. Juan Carlos Estenssoro Fuchs, Los Colores de la Plebe: Razon y Mestizaje en el Perti
Colonial, in LOS CUADROS DEL MESTIZAJE DEL VIRREY AMAT 66 (Natalia Mahlufed., 2000).
41. Borrowing from Ann Stoler's prodigious insights about the links between the carnal and the
imperial, feminist scholars routinely call our attention to the "contact zone" of sexuality that is intrinsic
to Conquest and forced colonial encounter. See ANN STOLER, CARNAL KNOWLEDGE AND IMPERIAL
POWER 14 (2002). See also KIRSTEN FISCHER, SUSPECT RELATIONS: SEX, RACE AND RESISTANCE IN
COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA (2002); JOANE NAGEL, RACE, ETHNICrrY AND SEXUALITY: INTIMATE
INTERSECTIONS, FORBIDDEN FRONTIERS (2003); SEX, LOVE, RACE: CROSSING BOUNDARIES IN NORTH
AMERICAN HISTORY (Martha Hodes ed., 1999). The pattern of regulating sexuality through threats of
draconian punishment was ubiquitous in the history of conquest/settler colonialism-particularly
during the early stages when patriarchal domestic arrangements were supplanted by concubinage,
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there was ever a stable racial order (a questionable proposition), the
solidity of the racial trinity (Indian, Spaniard, and negro) had already
dissolved into capacious categories of mestizo and mulato in the previous
century. By the seventeenth century, these categories had fragmented into
infinite equations based on quotients of hybridized blood.42 Maria de los
Angeles, for instance, was identified as a cuarterona de mulata in 1659.
As Martha Hodes reminds us, "the making of the most rigid legal binary
required the most detailed articulation of fractions."43
I argue that it is precisely those women and men who were nearly white
in terms of phenotype and associated behavioral codes of calidad whose
marriages were most heavily surveiled. These women were frequently
identified as quinterona de mestiza or cuarterona de mulata, but this
bureaucratic designation was at odds with their unstable public perception.
Marriage to an espahol was the last remaining barrier to complete
whiteness for them and their children. That final crossing virtually
guaranteed their access to the most privileged social status that was
vigilantly guarded by criollos, who were pathologically obsessed with
fears of contaminated blood (mancha de sangre). Emergent elites and
poor white criollos44 were often threatened by these marriages because
they exposed the creaky edifice of their own claims to white privilege.
When ambiguity destabilized the boundaries that demarcated status and
privilege, ecclesiastical law dealt harshly with offenders-even when it
contravened a deeply held principle regarding the sanctity of marriage.
This harsh treatment conveniently suited the party seeking to escape his or
her marital obligations.
PART THREE: To HAVE AND TO HOLD (TO WED OR TO BED?)
Iberian lawmakers had always favored concubinage over marriage
between partners of widely differing social status, particularly when the
unions involved elite men of high administrative rank.45 Marriage was a
involuntary and inter-ethnic sex. Colonial administrators and viceroys repeatedly sought to impose
edicts forbidding inter-ethnic coupling, miscegenation, and concubinage. As Stoler observes, "the
intimate ... is foundational to the material terms in which colonial projects were carried out. [We
need to] ask explicitly why such projects were riveted on the intimate and so concerned about sex."
STOLER, supra, at 15.
42. MAGNUS MORNER, RACE MIXTURE IN THE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA (1967).
43. Martha Hodes, Fractions and Frictions in the U.S. Census of 1890, in HAUNTED BY EMPIRE
240, 241 (Ann Laura Stoler ed., 2006).
44. Criollos were those of Spanish parentage born in the Americas. "Blanco" or "white" was not
a racial term used in the seventeenth century. White criollos were referred to as espaholes. Negros
criollos were blacks born in the Americas, as opposed to bozales-black slaves born and procured in
Africa.
45. The favorability of concubinage over mixed-status marriage is traced to the Roman law roots
of Iberian law. As Robert Burns notes in his gloss on the sections dealing with Concubines,
Illegitimate Children, and Adoption in the Siete Partidas, "Alfonso saw formal concubinage as a
mortal sin, the civil law tolerated it as a lesser evil in the social sphere and merely regulated it." In
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principal forum in which racial hierarchies were monitored and negotiated.
As illustrated in the annulment proceeding of Pascual de Dueias and
Maria de los Angeles, enforcing equality through marriage was by no
means the exclusive terrain of elites.4 Until the promulgation of the Real
Pragmrtica in 1778, 47 mixed status marriage was never illegal, though it
was socially disreputable and imprudent for the upwardly mobile or
ascendant classes. Legally, marriage to an enslaved woman bore
consequences for the offspring of the couple. In practice, however, the
unions of free plebeian men and enslaved women were neither rigorously
prohibited nor severely punished. 48 Even the Prgmatica exempted castas,
blacks, and mulattoes from the strict requirement of parental consent until
1803.4' However, as the error de persona cases make clear, full
disclosure of one's enslaved status was required, or the marriage could be
terms of regulations, "a married man could not legally have a concubine, nor could a cleric.... Yet
concubinage [was] actually desirable for a governor in far off countries where a suitable marriage
[was] impossible during his term." See 4 LAS SIETE PARTIDAS xxi (Robert 1. Bums ed., Samuel
Parsons Scott trans., Univ. of Pa. Press 2001). Concubinage was also suitable for military men, whose
temporary sojourns away from their wives permitted them to form relationships with local women.
The Church formally frowned upon concubinage because sexual intercourse occurred outside of the
sacrament of marriage. Because of its widespread occurrence in lower-status communities, the Church
grudgingly acknowledged concubinary unions if the couple had children, if there were no legal
impediments to marriage and if the couple's sexual relationship was exclusive. See James Brundage,
Concubinage and Marriage in Medieval Canon Law, in SEX, LAW, AND MARRIAGE IN THE MIDDLE
AGES 1 (1993). Concubinage among lower status groups accrued greater legal sanctions if women
were involved with married men (causing abandonment) and merited utmost opprobrium if the women
were married themselves, or if the couple resolutely refused to formalize their union after investigation
by the Court. See generally ANA SANCHEZ, AMANCEBADOS, HECHICEROS Y REBELDES: CHANCAY,
SIGLO XVII (1991); DAISY RiPODAS ARDANAZ, EL MATRIMONIO EN INDIAS (1977).
46. According to the endogamous scheme that Pascual outlined in his statement, he should have
married a mestiza. He believed that Maria de los Angeles was a mestiza, and filed for an annulment
upon finding that she was an enslaved cuarterona. The court immediately dismissed Pascual's claim.
No matter how indeterminate her appearance, Maria's sumame identified her as someone of African-
criollo heritage. (On the ethnic designation of surnames, see COPE, supra note 9, at 67.) Pascual's
identity as a mestizo was itself a problematic basis to claim racial hierarchy, as the mestizo of the mid-
seventeenth century was born of parents of dubious heritage. As David Cahill points out, the mestizo
category in administrative use could have been a quinterdn, a tercerdn or even an urbanized Indian.
Cahill, supra note 32, at 341.
47. The Real Pragmctica of 1778 was part of the Bourbon Crown's reforms both on the peninsula
and in the colonies that were intended to modernize the colonial economy and strengthen royal
metropolitan power in the face of criollo demands. The Pragmtica significantly encroached on the
Church's autonomy by consolidating the power of secular courts over the temporal aspects of
marriage. The Crown adroitly maintained its strategic alliance with the Church by leaving sacred
aspects of marriage in the hands of the ecclesiastical courts. Both Church and Crown were
exceedingly concerned with asserting "moral control" over the colonial population, and legislation was
passed to penalize "crimes against public morality." See Christiana Borchat de Moreno, El control de
la moral pTblica como elemento de las Reformas Borbdnicas en Quito, in MUJERES, FAMILIA Y
SOCIEDAD EN LA HISTORIA DE AMERICA LATINA 446 (Scarlett O'Phalen Godoy & Margarita Zegarra
Fl6res eds., 2005).
48. JUDITH EVANS GRUBBS, LAW AND FAMILY IN LATE ANTIQUITY 262 (1995). As Evans Grubbs
notes, this relative laxity was not the case for mixed status unions between free women and enslaved
men. Those unions were severely punished, particularly if they involved women who consorted with
their slaves.
49. Socolow, supra note 3, at 212.
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annulled under ecclesiastical law. In addition, the male suitor was
required to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the condition of his
bride. As the canonists held,
Error about the condition, the family, or the fortune of the individual,
though produced by disingenuous representations, does not at all
affect the validity of marriage. A man, who means to act upon such
representations, should verify them by his own inquiries. The law
presumes that he uses due caution in a matter in which the happiness
of life is so materially involved; and it makes no provision for blind
credulity, however it may have been produced. 10
Efforts were made to both deter and discourage mixed status marriages,
both through legal regulation and societal disapproval. Peninsular legal
rules were drafted with the administrative goal of endogamous
reproduction but these rules were applied within divergent social realities
and cultural milieus. The Partidas provided an exit strategy for those who
claimed to have married a slave in error-but not in blind credulity.5
Indeed, one's ignorance of his or her partner's enslavement was subject to
strenuous proof. Arguably, within the closed corporate world of the
Limefio aristocracy, these mistakes were far more infrequent. However, in
the protean social strata where enslaved, freed, and free lived and worked
together, and where extensive inter-mixing yielded phenotypically
ambiguous offspring, "mistakes" were plausible.
Indeed, while the litigants strategically used elite racial logic to
substantiate their claims, the cases show us the everyday interactions of a
remarkably fluid colonial society, in marked distinction to the highly
stratified picture of the "separate republics" portrayed in legislative edicts
and official history. The ubiquity of slave labor in virtually all
mercantilist, domestic, and artisanal sectors of Lima meant that freed and
enslaved blacks, lower castes, less prosperous Spaniards and criollos
worked in the same pursuits. It was possible, then, for some slaves to pass
as "free" and to portray themselves as members of higher castes and noble
origins (especially if they were attached to elite masters, although the
credibility of these claims is suspect). The line between free and enslaved
was amorphous, enabling men and women to keep one foot in the free
world and one in the slave community. This was a vibrant, transient,
multi-ethnic space charged with calumnious intimations of dishonorable
sexual liaisons, and complex patron-client relationships. Extensive
contact inevitably led to tensions and emotions that would divide slave,
50. John Ayliffe, Paregonjuris canonici anglicani, 362-64 (1726).
51. Partida IV, Title lX, Law 1: "Where an accusation is made for any of the reasons aforesaid, it
is not ... an accusation ... but rather a mistake, where the party thought he was marrying a person
who was free, and married a slave." See also SANCHEZ, supra note 45.
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poor and free. 2 When relationships deteriorated (whether sexual or
economic), slaves, plebeians, and Spaniards turned to the courts with
decisive litigiousness to settle old scores and smoldering grudges. Let us
now turn to a detailed examination of these processes in the annulment
petition of Pedro Ramirez and Maria Josefa Martinez.
PART FOUR: THE ANNULMENT PETITION OF PEDRO RAMiREZ AND MARIA
JOSEFA MARTINEZ
On May 12, 1682, Pedro Ramirez asked the Archbishopric Court of
Lima to annul his marriage to Maria Josefa Martinez de Soto. Pedro
discovered Maria Josefa's true identity as a slave when he attempted to
establish an independent household seven months after the couple married.
Throughout the preceding seven months, the couple had lived with dofia
Beatriz de Tovar, Maria Josefa's owner. Dofia Beatriz resolutely opposed
Pedro's domestic plans and refused to let Maria Josefa go. As dofia
Beatriz maintained, she was not legally required to grant Pedro and Maria
anything beyond weekend conjugal visits. After a brief exchange of
petitions demanding and rebutting the legal basis for Maria Josefa's
release, Pedro abruptly dropped his claim. One month later, Pedro sought
an annulment of the marriage altogether. According to Pedro, it was
inconceivable that a Spaniard of "good" parentage would willingly enter
into marriage with a slave and contaminate his lineage. (No es creible que
siendo espahol de calidad habia de manchar mi sangre con una esclava
de mala nota).
The legal determination of Pedro's case revolved around the credibility
of his claim to marital fraud and error de persona. The curious point in
this case was that everyone knew of Maria Josefa's enslavement except her
suitor.5 3 The courtship and marriage took place in the multi-ethnic parish
52. Rebecca Scott, Exploring the Meaning of Freedom: Postemancipation Societies in
Comparative Perspective, 68 HISP. AM. HIST. REV. 407 (1988).
53. Founded in 1568 as the urban population outgrew the Cathedral, the parish of Santa Ana was
located to the east of the Plaza Mayor. For a detailed review of the founding of the parish and its
constituency, see Bernabd Cobo's invaluable study, Historia de la Fundaci6n de Lima, reprinted in 1
MONOGRAFIAS HIST6RICAS SOBRE LA CIUDAD DE LIMA 126, 199 (1935). Since status, race, and
ethnicity were spatially reproduced in colonial Lima, the aristocracy lived in solares (city plots)
located in close proximity to the Plaza Mayor. Although imprecise, it was possible to correlate elite
status and prestige for whites with residential proximity to the Plaza. According to Cobo's description,
the Plaza Santa Ana was dominated by those espaholes in the meat trade. Id. at 53. Santa Ana
encompassed the Cercado as a sub-parish, which was administered by the Jesuits until their expulsion
in 1767. Formally, the Cercado and Santa Ana comprised one parish, but the Cercado was set aside
for Indians (naturales) and continued to attract Indian migrants to the city throughout the colonial and
republican period. Of importance here is Santa Anm's hospital, which was established to care for the
Indian population. Santa Ana also had a large black population. In Bowser's review of late sixteenth-
century parish records, Santa Ana had the second largest population of blacks and mulattos in Lima.
BOWSER, supra note 38, at 339. Blacks comprised about 49% of Lima's population in the 1613
census. These demographic facts, taken together, give us insights into the multi-ethnic composition
of, and the concomitant multi-ethnic relationships within this parish.
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of Santa Ana. We presume that the white residents themselves (anxious
about the slipperiness of their own claims to respectability) carefully
erected ethnic barriers to prevent these kinds of "racial mistakes." During
their courtship and marriage, it seems reasonable to assume that Pedro
would have guessed, or would have been told, that Maria Josefa was in
domestic servitude with dofia Beatriz-particularly since everyone else in
their very closely-knit neighborhood knew that she was dofia Beatriz's
slave. The subterfuge that Pedro decried was indicative of the porosity of
racial boundaries, and the residents' broader ambivalence about the
boundaries themselves. Their silence may also suggest that the residents
had more invested in their relationship with Maria Josefa than with Pedro
at the onset of the marriage. In other words, the residents may have been
prepared to accept the relationship and Maria Josefa's crossover into
whiteness if Pedro himself had accepted it. But given the foundational
assumptions of the racial order, we presume that the residents would have
alerted Pedro to the mancha in Maria Josefa's blood or her enslaved status
before he entered into the marriage.
In her rebuttal, Maria Josefa asked the court to find her marriage to
Pedro true and valid and deny the annulment petition. Maria Josefa
somewhat coyly got around the fact that she never verbally disclosed her
enslaved status by saying that Pedro simply never inquired. Maria Josefa
further contended that it was Pedro's responsibility to inquire into the
status of the person with whom he sought to contract marriage,
particularly at the time of petitioning the marriage license. Moreover, she
maintained that Pedro could not have failed to notice that she was
encumbered to dofia Beatriz, given that the couple lived in the house of
her owner. Maria finally argued that the condition of slavery was not itself
an obstacle to marriage.
After Maria Josefa's tour de force, Pedro asked the Procurator to
summon Maria Josefa's friends and relatives to testify about their efforts to
ensure that he remained ignorant of Maria Josefa's status. Pedro's legal
strategy was twofold: 1) to prove a deliberate cover-up by Maria Josefa's
family to trick him into marriage, and 2) to establish the impossibility of
discovering Maria Josefa's enslaved status given her Spanish phenotype,
and her virtuous and noble comportment. His first witness was Juana de
Tovar, Maria Josefa's mother. Juana de Tovar's statement was not entirely
persuasive to the Procurator. First, Juana clearly acted in her capacity as
Maria Josefa's mother in the marriage negotiations with Pedro. Juana was
identified consistently throughout the entire proceedings as either mulata
libre, or parda libre. It is thus highly improbable that Pedro could claim
that his sole intention was to marry a woman whose parents were white,
although his interrogatories queried exactly that: si saben que el dicho
Pedro Ramirez es h'o de padres espahioles tales que si hubiera tenido
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conocimiento del error de la persona no hubiese venido en el contrato y
celebraci6n del casamiento porque su yntenci6n es y ha sido casarse con
mujer espahola.
5 4
Knowing that Maria Josefa was still enslaved, Juana tried to convince
Pedro to marry her younger daughter Yn6z. Yn6z was born after Juana
had been manumitted by dofia Beatriz's family, and was therefore free.
Pedro refused her offer of Yndz, insisting that he wanted to marry only
Maria Josefa. Juana admitted that upon seeing Pedro's determination to
marry Maria Josefa-presumably based on affection or infatuation-she
deliberately withheld information about her daughter's enslaved status.
Under oath, she confessed that even if Pedro had asked, she would have
denied that Maria Josefa was a slave, fearing that this would have
discouraged Pedro and ruined her daughter's chance of freedom (hubiese
perdido su remedio).55 Instead of telling Pedro the truth, she gambled on
dofia Beatriz's willingness to liberate Maria Josefa. In Juana's mind,
manumission that potentially occurred before the wedding was tantamount
to giving Pedro a free bride. Legally, if Maria Josefa were freed before
the marriage occurred, her children would not have been compromised by
their mother's enslaved status.
Juana went straight away to dofia Beatriz, putting Pedro's marriage
proposal before her. The fact that a Spaniard of a "good family" wanted
to marry Maria Josefa could not have been lost on dofia Beatriz. But dofia
Beatriz refused. Juana begged dofia Beatriz as a God-fearing and
benevolent Christian to liberate Maria Josefa, but dofia Beatriz told her
that it was not yet time. Given dofia Beatriz's refusal, Juana seemingly
had two alternatives: 1) to tell Pedro the truth, or 2) to hope that dofia
Beatriz would release Maria Josefa from servitude when presented with
the marriage as a fait accompli. Pedro's advocate crafted the
interrogatories to elicit yes or no answers, which left Juana no room to
rationalize her decision.56 Juana's sworn testimony that she willfully failed
54. The designation espahol implied that Pedro wanted to marry a woman of white parentage (see
supra note 44). On the gender-specific nature of "Spanish" designation, see Elizabeth Kuznesof,
Ethnic and Gender Influences on "Spanish" Creole Society, 4 COLONIAL LATIN AM. REV. 1530
(1995).
55. AAL, supra note 1. The motive behind Juana's deliberate silence was corroborated by Pedro's
witness. Melchora de la Losa, cuarterona de mestiza, soltera que vive en casa de doiha Beatriz de
Tovar detras del convento de Santa Clara, Exp. 20.
56. Counsel for each party prepared a set of interrogatories that were read to the witnesses who
either were summoned, or who came to the court with knowledge of the complaint. The complications
raised by relying on interrogatories have been constantly noted. See, e.g., Leo Garofalo, Conjuring
with Coca and the Inca: the Andeanization of Lima's Afro-Peruvian Ritual Specialists, 1580-1690, 63
AMERICAS 53, 58 (2006). In addition to the filter of the notary's pen, the potentially coercive nature of
legal interrogation, and the stultifying nature of formulaic language, the interrogatories were
deliberately crafted to elicit yes or no answers. After lengthy leading questions, the respondents were
required merely to indicate their answers with a straightforward "Digan si o no." See Jeremy
Mumford, Litigation as Ethnography in Sixteenth-Century Peru: Polo de Ondegardo and the
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to disclose Maria Josefa's status because she privileged her daughter's
freedom thus corroborated Pedro's insistence that he had been deceived
into marriage by a conniving, ambitious mother.
Pedro's advocate drafted five questions that were posed to the witnesses
in an interrogatory. Although the interrogatories were notoriously loaded
with information to elicit the answers most favorable to the party posing
them--and would under any modern standards of evidence be
immediately inadmissible in courtroom cross-examination--they are more
interesting for what they assert than the answers themselves. 7  For
example, Pedro's second question asked the witness to confirm whether
both Juana de Tovar and Dofia Beatriz had contrived to cover up Maria
Josefa's enslaved status by dressing her like a Spanish maiden from birth.
Pedro also asked whether it was true that Maria Josefa was so white that it
was impossible for anyone to discern her true calidad: Digan si o no (say
yes or no).58 Witnesses could embellish their statements in greater detail,
but these more fulsome statements came at the beginning when they were
asked to state their general knowledge of the complaint. Both parties were
entitled to draft lengthy interrogatories and publicly summon their own
witnesses. But in this case, Maria Josefa did not produce any questions.
Instead, she merely responded to Pedro's legal actions---often in a dilatory
fashion, without her own advocate. Thus, we have a very limited rendition
of Maria Josefa's side of the story-somewhat atypical in these types of
records that have lengthy rebuttals and counter-claims.
Notwithstanding Juana's testimony, the Procurator found merit in Maria
Josefa's claim that it was Pedro's responsibility to determine the calidad
(i.e., character and lineage) of the woman he sought to marry. Thus,
Procurator Villag6mez's response granted Maria Josefa the full benefit of
the law:
As Maria Josefa contends in her written brief, the said Pedro Ramirez
solicited her hand in marriage, and according to reason and the law of
the marriage contract, the contracting party bears the responsibility of
examining and investigating the quality, lineage, and character of the
woman he wishes to marry. We presume he followed the law, and
knew the nature of the person he married, as is brought to our
attention by the defendant. For these reasons, and in the defense of
the matrimonial cause, we ask your Merciful Honor to deny the
annulment petition and compel the said Pedro Ramirez to resume
Mitimaes, 88 HiSP. AM. HIST. REV. 5, 15 (2008). On the production of notarial truth, see Kathryn
Bums, Notaries, Truth, and Consequences, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 350 (2005).
57. Mumford, supra at 15.
58. AAL, supra note i, Por las preguntas siguientes se examinen los testigos que fuesen
presentados porparte de Pedro Rainirez, 21 de abril 1682, Exp. 13.
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married life with Maria Josefa under pain of ex-communication.5 9
The Procurator, Doctor don Pedro Villag6mez proved a formidable
defender of the holy institution of marriage. 6° One week after reading
Maria Josefa's testimony, Villag6mez recommended that the court deny
Pedro's petition. Villag6mez based his decision primarily on the law of
contracts, but also on the strength of Maria Josefa's plea, which urged the
court to find the marriage valid. The fact that two months earlier Pedro
had asked the court to issue an injunction ordering dofia Beatriz to respect
his conjugal rights undoubtedly colored Villag6mez's view of the merits of
Pedro's claim. Not coincidentally-given his role as the defender of
marriage in the Archbishopric court 61-Villag6mez was the official who
signed the order to dofia Beatriz. Thus, Villag6mez made short shrift of
Pedro's claim weeks later, concluding with a stern reprimand for Pedro to
resume married life with Maria Josefa.
Seemingly undaunted by this development, Pedro appealed
Villag6mez's ruling. Pedro's response focused principally on Villag6mez's
point that it was incumbent upon him to investigate Maria Josefa's
background and status. He offered extensive evidence of Maria Josefa's
dress, circumspect behavior, mien, and public image-all of which
befitted an elite doncella (chaste maiden of virtuous upbringing) of
seventeenth-century Limefio society. Ten witnesses confirmed his
impressions of Maria Josefa's exquisite physical appearance and virtuous
public persona. Pedro's interrogatories elicited the witnesses' testimonies
of Maria Josefa's modesty, virtue, and seclusion (virtudy recogimiento).62
By all accounts, dofia Beatriz treated Maria Josefa as her own daughter:
she outfitted Maria Josefa with the accoutrements, jewelry, and gold-
59. Porque como dice la dicha Maria Josefa en su escrito en que contesta la demanda el dicho
Pedro Ramirez solicit6 el casamiento y como quiera que segtin la raz6n del contrato a dl le toca el
examinar la calidad y prendad de la mujer con quien habia de contraer el mairimonio, se presume
muy conforme a derecho que despugs se celebrr fue con el conocimiento de quien era y no parece que
fue de entender lo contrario de las instancias y diligencias que se insinuaron en el escrito de
contestaci6n presentado por la mujer. Por todo lo cual y lo mas que hace queda a favor de la causa
matrimonial: A Vmd. pido y suplico declare no haber lugar la dicha nulidady mande con el apremio
de las censuras que el dicho Pedro Ramirez haga vida maridable con la dicha Maria Josefa Martinez
por serjusticia que pido y por la defensa desta causa matrimonial.
60. Doctor don Pedro de Villag6mez was well versed in all aspects of ecclesiastical law and
governance. In addition to his role as Procurator, he was the priest of Our Lady Santa Aia parish in
Lima and served as a visitador in an idolatry extirpation campaign in 1650. More importantly,
Villag6mez was the nephew of the Archbishop of Lima, also named Pedro de Villag6mez. The elder
Villagrmez was an ardent proponent of the campaigns to extirpate idolatry in Andean communities,
and his nephew (who presided over these proceedings) seemed equally passionate about the issue. See
KENNETH MILLS, IDOLATRY AND ITS ENEMIES: COLONIAL ANDEAN RELIGION AND EXTIRPATION
1640-1750 (1997).
61. On the responsibilities of the ecclesiastical court with regard to marriage, annulment, and
divorce, see CONCILIOS LIMENSES 1551-1772 (Ruben Vargas Ugarte ed., 1951), at Primer Concilio,
Constituci6n 63; Tercer Concilio Caps. 7, 35; Sexto Concilio Caps. 14, 16.
62. Van Deusen, supra note 12.
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embroidered shawls and veils worn exclusively by elite women.
According to neighbors, Maria Josefa accompanied dofia Beatriz to mass
and all public events in her carriage and was always impeccably dressed.
63
As Pedro reasoned, he did investigate Maria Josefa's calidad with all the
tools he had at his disposal. What he saw, heard and inferred was that
Maria Josefa's fine dress, decorum, virtuous reputation, and noble
upbringing indubitably established her whiteness and her eligibility for
marriage.
Indeed, both Beatriz and Maria Josefa violated the sumptuary laws of
the period that were promulgated precisely to avoid racial indeterminacy
and to clearly demarcate social status. For example, a royal decree issued
in 1612 proclaimed: "No mulata nor black woman, whether free or
enslaved, can be bedecked or adorned in jewels, or gold or silver, nor can
she wear pearls or silk dresses from Castile, nor silk gloves, nor can she be
seen in accessories with gold or silver laced edges, under threat of one
hundred lashes and confiscation of the prohibited items of clothing."'
These laws attempted to limit the dress and jewelry choices of lower-caste
women, especially regulating their appearance when attending mass.
65
However, according to Father Bernab6 Cobo in his compendious chronicle
of seventeenth-century Lima: "The elegance of the residents of this city in
their dress and accessories is such that in general, one cannot distinguish
between nobles and those who are not of that class, because they all dress
with such luxuriance, since the pragmatics issued in Spain regulating dress
codes are not proclaimed in Lima. ' '66 Cobo's observations lead us to
conclude that the sumptuary laws were neither proclaimed nor enforced
(like so many other royal legislative edicts).
Pedro echoes Father Cobo's observation in his rendition of Maria
Josefa's appearance. According to Pedro:
I never knew that she was a slave, because her clothes, her
accoutrements, her bearing, and the entire manner in
which the said dofia Beatriz treated the said Maria Josefa
was that of a Spaniard, and I could never have been
63. AAL, supra note 1, Probanza de doha Ana de Barrios Urrea, espahola doncella, 4 de julio,
1682, Exp. 26.
64. Que ninguna negra ni mulata, libre ni cautiva, pueda traer ninguna joya de oro ni plata, ni
perlas ni vestidos de seda de Castilla, ni mantos de seda, ni pasamanos de oro ni de plata, so pena de
cien azotesy deperdimiento de tales vestidos,joyas, perlasy lo demds. KONETZKE, 2 COLECCION DE
DOCUMENTOS, supra note 15, at 182. On sumptuary laws in general, see ARNOLD BAUER, GOODS,
POWER, HISTORY: LATIN AMERICA'S MATERIAL CULTURE (2001).
65. See BOWSER, supra note 38, at 153; Ricardo Cantuarias Acosta, Las Modas Limehias, in LIMA
EN EL SIGLO XVI 287-307 (Laura Gutibrrez Arbuli ed., 2005).
66. El trajino y lustre de los ciudadanos en el tratamiento y aderezo de sus personas es tan
grande y general que no se puede en un dia defiesta concocer por el pelo quien es cada uno; porque
todos, nobles y los que no lo son, visten corta y ricamente ... porque no Ilegan ac6 las pragndticas
que sepublican en Espaha sobre los trajes...." Cobo, supra note 53, at 72.
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expected to understand that she was a slave, especially as
she was held up in public for all to see as a Spaniard.
Everyone saw her as I did, with the ornate shawls and fine
accessories of a Spanish woman when she attended mass
or public festivities in the company of dofia Beatriz. She
appeared to be a Spaniard of noble calidad.
67
Pedro also summoned Maria Josefa's younger half-sisters, Ynrz and
Augustina, who both corroborated Pedro's account of racial fraud and
subterfuge. As they said, Maria Josefa's whiteness (blancura, sometimes
referred to as hicidez), her smooth straight hair, and her elaborate clothing
enabled her to dissimulate Spanish status.68  From her appearance, those
who did not know her could never guess her true status and calidad. In
addition, Maria Josefa's racial performance was enhanced by dofia
Beatriz-whose status was not in doubt. Presumably, although the sisters
looked very similar in terms of phenotype, Maria Josefa's whiteness was
complemented by Beatriz's pedigree and her preferential treatment of
Maria Josefa. Pedro thus disputed Villag6mez's point that he should have
been able to discover the master-slave relationship that bound the two
women. According to Pedro, dofia Beatriz never resisted their courtship,
and Maria Josefa was free to come and go as she pleased with total free
will. It was only when Pedro tried to whisk Maria Josefa away from dofia
Beatriz that he encountered resistance: se puso dificultad a la salida
respecto de querer apartar la casa para buscar la vida. In light of this
visible evidence and behavioral consistency, Pedro asked, how could he
discern the interior psyche of a woman? Drawing upon a gendered and
racialized script of female sin and connivance (with unequivocal legal
purchase in an ecclesiastical court) Pedro portrayed himself as a powerless
victim of fraud.
Pedro amassed an impressive number of witnesses, drawn from a wide
socio-racial spectrum of Limefio society: four doncellas, a male Spanish
67. Nunca Ilegue a conocer que era esclava porque los tratos, los vestuarios y lo general con que
la dicha doha Beatriz trataba a la dicha Maria Josefa era de espahola, y nunca se pudo entender que
fuese esclava respecto a lo dicho y asi tenidndola al pueblo y vigndola con los ornatos de espahola
como era Ilevarla con manto a la iglesia yfestividades ptblicas constantes que la habian de tener por
espahola y de buena calidad.
68. The Spanish word disimular could be clumsily translated as "passing." Passing functions as
one of several terms to designate the visual instability of race and gendered identity. In terms of
clothing-important in the determination of Maria Josefa's identity as free and white-individuals don
clothing that is gendered, raced, and classed to successfully convince the public of their identity.
Racial passing in the United States is generally accompanied by unilateral deception of whites by
those who look phenotypically white but who could be raced otherwise. This notion of passing for
social privilege was taken up by Gunnar Myrdal, who referred to a conspiracy on the part of other
blacks who might know about the racial deception. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE
NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944). It is unclear how much of this deception is at
play here, but the unilateral nature of passing is particular to the US context. In the colonial context,
"whitening" (i.e., racial drift), not passing, is the objective.
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dry-goods merchant, and two cuarteronas de parda and one cuarterona de
mestiza. The two remaining witnesses were Juana de Tovar, and the
indomitable dofia Beatriz herself. All ten witnesses lived in the Santa Ana
parish in close proximity to dofia Beatriz's house. Six of the nine female
witnesses were of Maria Josefa's age cohort or younger, ranging from
fourteen to twenty years of age. All of the witnesses made reference to the
carta de liberta 9 that granted Juana de Tovar her freedom. We presume
that with their assistance or collusion, Pedro was able to procure the carta
de libertad On June 15, Pedro introduced the carta de libertad
manumitting Juana de Tovar as evidence of Maria Josefa's enslaved status.
Juana had been manumitted twenty years previously, and Maria Josefa
was born four years prior to Juana's freedom. By law, she retained the
status of her mother at birth.
The credibility of Pedro's error de persona claim ultimately rested on
Maria Josefa's "appropriate" performance-i.e. her performance as free
and white. Common to these error depersona cases, procurators evaluated
how the women were perceived in the community by eliciting numerous
witness testimonies, given their ambiguous appearance and parentage. 70 It
is interesting to note that despite Pedro's capacity to summon witnesses, he
did not call on anyone who knew him personally prior to the marriage.
From the record, Pedro strikes the reader as virtually anonymous. In other
words, Pedro was never asked to corroborate or verify his own whiteness.
He claimed legitimate birth, Spanish parentage, and residency in the Santa
Ana parish but those claims were never supported by the testimony of his
parents, family members, priests, or business associates. We never learn
what he did for a living-if anything. He did not have sufficient financial
resources to establish an independent household upon marriage, and had to
rely on Maria Josefa's owner to give him a place to live-in a
neighborhood in which he claimed residency.71 Given that all his
witnesses were people who knew Maria Josefa, his claim to residency in
the Santa Ana parish was apocryphal to say the least. Nonetheless, his
dubious residency status did not imperil or even compromise his claims to
whiteness. From the way his interrogatories were worded, everyone
69. A carta de libertad was a notarized document that proved the manumission of a slave.
70. In this sense, the proceedings closely mirrored the racial determination trials conducted in the
United States described by Ariela Gross, in which local juries deliberated over cases of racial identity
on the basis of performance, "common sense," and blood quantum. ARIELA GROSS, WHAT BLOOD
WON'T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008). As Gross reminds us, "racial
knowledge resided not in documents but in communities, and it required reputation evidence to
determine." Id. at 24.
71. Residency status was important for males. Vecinos were granted voting rights and could serve
in official administrative capacities. Naturales were tied by birth to a certain place, but they were not
necessarily vested with the full rights of citizenship. Moradores could be born elsewhere, but enjoy
residency rights within a community. See TAMAR HERZOG, DEFINING NATIONS: IMMIGRANTS AND
CITIZENS IN EARLY MODERN SPAIN AND SPANISH AMERICA (2003).
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concurred that Pedro, as a member of a "good family" (un hombre de
bien), would not have compromised his lineage through marriage to a
slave. Once again, the neighbors' silence is telling, given their volubility
after Pedro summoned them to testify. Their responses prompt the reader
to believe that they really endorsed the racial hierarchy upon which Pedro
rested his claim. But if they were that invested in the racial hierarchy they
subsequently espoused, an inter-ethnic marriage of a Spaniard de bien
with a slave would precariously tip the racial scale so that non-elite whites
would recalibrate it by exposing Maria Josefa's status. It bears repeating
that the successful outcome of Pedro's claim rested on his ability to prove
conspiracy among all involved to cover up Maria Josefa's status.
As Pedro built his case with increasingly strong evidence, Procurator
Villag6mez also proceeded with his investigation and reviewed the earlier
conjugal rights proceeding filed in April 1682. Apparently Villag6mez
was not convinced by the length of Pedro's deception and agreed with
Maria Josefa that Pedro should have suspected that she belonged to doiia
Beatriz prior to contracting the marriage or soon thereafter. Villag6mez
suspended proceedings on August 31, ordering dofia Beatriz to testify as to
whether or not she had consented to the marriage between Pedro and
Maria Josefa. Dofia Beatriz had never been asked directly whether she
consented to the marriage before it was contracted, which was precisely
what Villag6mez needed to know to rule on the validity of Pedro's fraud
claim. Dofia Beatriz's refusal to liberate Maria Josefa was cryptically
recorded in Juana's testimony, simply by saying that it was not yet time.
But dofia Beatriz's responses in the interrogatories were equivocal about
the issue of her consent.
In her statement issued on April 23, dofia Beatriz claimed that upon
learning of the impending marriage plans she consulted her confessor to
see whether she could impede the marriage by placing Maria Josefa in a
convent. Her confessor negated this possibility, pointing out that entry
into religious devotion was itself a divine oath. The same rules of marital
consent applied to religious service: guardians, parents, or owners could
not morally or legally avoid an undesired marriage by forcibly placing
their charges in holy confinement. Furthermore, religious confinement
would effectively remove Maria Josefa from her household. Apparently
agonizing over the alternative, dofia Beatriz had no option but to
accommodate Pedro in her home if she wanted to keep Maria Josefa by
her side and in her service. As a devout Catholic, dofia Beatriz decided
that the lesser of both evils would be to provide the couple with a place to
live to eliminate any threat of immoral co-habitation. Villag6mez could
reasonably infer two things from reviewing dofia Beatriz's statement: 1)
she accepted the marriage by allowing the couple into her home; 2) Pedro
could not credibly maintain his claim of error depersona while living in a
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home where his wife was in domestic servitude.
Dofia Beatriz presumably had no great love for Villag6mez, who had
issued a declaratory judgment favoring Pedro's conjugal rights petition
back in April. But until her summons, dofia Beatriz had been surprisingly
quiet. She testified once on July 3, responding to Pedro's summons. But
in that statement, dofia Beatriz merely recounted her conversation with
Juana de Tovar during which she discouraged Juana from pursuing the
marriage negotiations with Pedro. Both women clearly had a longstanding
relationship. They were both forty years old and had grown up together in
the same household. From the terms of the carta de libertad, it appears
that Juana had been dofia Beatriz's childhood companion as well as her
personal slave. Juana was very young when she gave birth to Maria
Josefa-at most thirteen or fourteen years old.72 Maria Josefa did list a
father who bore her last name in her marriage petition, but for all we
know, he could have been a male within the Tovar household where Juana
served. By all accounts, dofia Beatriz loved Maria Josefa and treated her
like her own child. At times, Beatriz referred to herself as Maria Josefa's
spiritual parent. A childless and unmarried doncella, Beatriz raised Maria
Josefa in the genteel ways of the Spanish elite, educating her and giving
her the worldly possessions that were beyond Juana's means. Although
Juana was free, two of her daughters remained in Beatriz's service,
limiting Juana's maternal role and influence. We presume that a "good
marriage" would have been pleasing to dofia Beatriz. So, why then would
she refuse to let Maria Josefa go?
Dofia Beatriz vigorously maintained that she opposed the marriage,
before and after she learned of it, but the situation did not escalate into a
full-blown lawsuit until Pedro tried to remove Maria Josefa from her home
and service in April. Dofia Beatriz affirmed that she raised Maria Josefa
from birth to serve her as a dutiful daughter: desde que la naci6, la ha
tenido con sujeta de hia para el efecto de que me sirviese y asistiese como
to ha estado haciendo desde que tiene uso de raz6n. Even in this
statement alternating between authorial and reported speech,73 the notary
recorded the blurry distinction between filial piety and diligent servitude.
And Maria Josefa had been an exemplary charge until she married Pedro.
Rebutting the presumption in favor of manumission for beatific owners,
Beatriz averred that manumission was possible only for wealthy, powerful
72. Maria Josefa appears in the record to be anywhere from eighteen to twenty-seven years old.
When Maria Josefa gave her notarized consent to the marriage, she claimed that she was only eighteen
years old-thereby dating her birth after Juana's manumission. However, all the witnesses-Juana
included-confirmed that Maria Josefa was between twenty-four and twenty-six years old. Dofia
Beatriz claimed that Maria Josefa was twenty-seven years of age. Some of this incertitude is expected;
almost all litigants and their witnesses approximate their age (de edadpoco m6s o menos).
73. On the notion of inter-textuality in notarial statements, see JOUVE, supra note 5.
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women with many slaves at their disposal. In short, Beatriz was at pains
to prove both her Christian piety (which should have swayed her to
manumit Maria Josefa) and to refute any hint of egoism or selfishness in
claiming her property rights in Maria Josefa. Hence, she referred to
herself as a pobre doncella, who could not afford the luxury of parting
with her slave-who she had brought up like a daughter to take care of her
in her old age.74
As soon as Villag6mez suspended the proceedings, Pedro urged the
court to rule in his favor by claiming it was immaterial whether dofia
Beatriz had in fact consented to the marriage. As it turns out, the marriage
was a clandestine one, presented to dofia Beatriz as a fait accompli. But
the problem for Pedro was that since he was party to the deception, it was
becoming increasingly hard for him to claim that he had been ignorant of
Maria Josefa's status. According to dofia Beatriz, both Juana and Maria
Josefa requested permission for Maria Josefa to go to the Cathedral for
confession. In truth, Maria Josefa was going to give her statement of
consent, accompanied by her mother. The fact that Maria Josefa was going
to the Cathedral to confess, rather than to the church in Santa Ana, may
have raised Beatriz's suspicions-as it seems that was the time she sought
the advice of her own confessor. That week, Pedro and Maria Josefa
married in secret in Santa Ana. The priest and ecclesiastical notary who
issued the license clearly violated the Tridentine rules requiring the
posting of banns. Villag6mez suspected that something was amiss for
such a violation to have occurred. To complicate matters further, it was
Villag6mez who signed the Auto authorizing the couple to marry upon
confirmation from the notary in his court.
On October 12, Villag6mez asked for the pliego matrimonial to be
introduced into the proceedings. According to canon law, all couples had
to establish the exchange of consent, and their ability to contract their
intended marriage free from the impediments of pre-existing matrimonial
promises, surviving spouses, devotional oaths, and consanguinity. After
the exchange of consent, banns had to be posted in each parish where the
petitioners had resided for at least six months for three consecutive
Sundays. Among elite families, betrothals (esponsales) involved complex
negotiations, but for plebeian couples like Pedro and Maria, they were
more straightforward affairs. In the pliego matrimonial, dated September
27 1681, Pedro solemnly attested to his intention to marry Maria Josefa in
compliance with the will of God and the holy Church. 7 Pedro had stated
74. AAL, supra note 1, 25 de septiembre 1682, Doiha Beatriz de Tovar en los autos que sigue
Pedro Ramirez contra Maria Josefa Martinez, Exp. 44.
75. AAL, supra note 1, Expedientes Matrimoniales, Afo 1681. Pedro Ramirez, natural desta
ciudad, hixo legitimo de Pedro Ramirez y de dohia Paula de Ocampo, digo para mas servir a Dios
nuestro Sehor, tengo tratado de contraer matrimonio segoin horden de nuestra santa madre yglesia
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thus:
Pedro Ramirez, resident of this city and legitimate son of
Pedro Ramirez and dofia Paula de Ocampo declare that in
order to serve the Lord, our heavenly Father, I intend to
enter into marriage according to the law of our holy
Church with Maria Josefa Martinez de Soto, cuarterona,
resident of this city, and illegitimate daughter of Crist6bal
Martinez de Soto and Juana de Tovar. Before Your
Grace, I ask that you send for the said Maria Josefa to
receive her consent and that you gather information from
us both, confirming that we are both single and without
impediment to marry in order to issue the marriage
license. I ask that you exempt us from the three banns
required by the Holy Council of Trent so that any of the
priests of our holy parish Santa Ana can perform our
marriage.
Pedro's statement was typical of the declarations of intent to marry of the
time, but two points stand out immediately. First, he informed the notary
of Maria Josefa's status as a cuarterona, and also as the illegitimate
daughter of Juana de Tovar and Crist6bal Martinez de Soto. Second,
Pedro requested an exemption from the Tridentine rules, so that the priests
of Santa Ana could perform the marriage. The notary, who also verified
Maria Josefa's consent and eligibility to contract marriage, duly recorded
Pedro's marriage petition. That same day, the notary recorded three
witness statements testifying to the couple's eligibility to marry and
alleging their illicit cohabitation.76 The couple's prenuptial proceedings
went smoothly, and one day later, Villag6mez declared them free to
marry. Moreover, Villag6mez granted Pedro the exemption, authorizing
them to marry without requiring that the couple post three banns in the
parish. The couple's marriage was recorded in Santa Ana on September
30, 1681.
77
Though it is unstated in the pliego matrimonial, we reasonably assume
that Villag6mez's notary expedited the marriage to ameliorate the harm of
the couple's carnal sins. The Archbishopric Court's priority was for the
fornicating couple to legalize and sanctify their union.78 Villag6mez
con Maria Josefa Martinez de Soto, quarterona, natural desta ciudad, hija natural de Crist6bal de
Martinez de Soto y Juana de Tovar. Yasi ante Vmd pido y suplico mande que a la contenida se reciba
consentimiento y a ambos informaci6n de como somos solteros y se nos despache licencia para que
qualquier de los curas de mi sehoria Santa Ana nos pueda casar dispensando en las fres
amonestaciones que dispone el Santo Concilio de Trento.
76. AAL, supra note 1, Consentimiento y probanza de testigos, Pliegos Matrimoniales, Aho
1681.
77. AAL, supra note 1, Libro de Matrimonios de Espaholes, Santa Ana, Afo 1681.
78. SANCHEZ, supra note 45, at xxv.
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authorized most of the marriage petitions of the period if his notaries were
persuaded that there was no striking disparity in social status, and if other
conditions of consent and consanguinity were fulfilled. Court personnel
were encouraged during this period to exercise particular caution in
approving marriage petitions, precisely because the population was so
mobile.79 But Villag6mez expedited the proceedings if there was a hint of
illicit cohabitation, or in dire circumstances like the impending death or
relocation of one of the parties. Moreover, it was only within the
Archbishopric's offices (located in the Cathedral) that such an exemption
was granted.8" It is important to note Pedro's legal savvy-for he knew the
potential benefits of disclosing immoral cohabitation, and he went directly
to the Archbishopric's office in the Cathedral to request the exemption.
Certainly, banns should have been posted in Santa Ana. Disingenuous
couples proffered evidence of their cohabitation to get around the rules.
81
In fact, many plebeian couples merged confession with their statements of
consent-attesting to their sinful cohabitation as the reason to enter into
holy matrimony. Villag6mez summoned Pedro de Carvajal, his notary,
who had been in charge of the couple's pliego matrimonial. Carvajal
testified that he did indeed recommend the license because of the "mal
estado" of the petitioners. Carvajal also confirmed that he received Maria
Josefa's statement of consent in the Patio de los Naranjos-the part of the
Cathedral abutting the Archbishopric's administrative offices on that day.
As far as Pedro de Carvajal was concerned, there was no problem with
the proceedings at the time. Pedro declared his intent, Maria Josefa gave
her consent in the presence of her mother, and there were three witnesses
who swore to their eligibility to contract the marriage. Moreover, there
was verbal testimony regarding illicit cohabitation. But for the subsequent
annulment petition, Villag6mez would probably not have given a second
thought to the couple's prenuptial proceeding. The vast disparity in status
that Pedro subsequently alleged was not apparent to Carvajal at the onset
of the marriage. Thus, we can only surmise that when it was brought to the
court's attention, neither Villag6mez nor his staff believed Pedro's
allegation of prenuptial fraud. Although his staff was willing to mitigate
the sin of illicit cohabitation, Villag6mez was predisposed to deny any
petition that dismantled the sacred conjugal union. Thus, Villag6mez
presciently called for the marriage petition to build his case against Pedro's
79. Segundo Concilio Limense, Caps. 18-22. When reviewing the pliegos, it seems that particular
care was taken in the case of widows to verify the death of the former spouse. Widows whose spouses
died outside of Lima, whether in Spain or in other colonial sites, tended to present numerous witnesses
testifying to their eligibility to contract a new marriage.
80. RiPODAS, supra note 45, at 79-81; Sexto Concilio Limense, Caps. 9 & 10.
81. For similar machinations after the Pragmdtica was enacted, see RiPODAS, supra note 45, at
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claim to annulment. Upon review of the petition, he emphasized the
witnesses' unanimous statements about the illicit cohabitation between
Pedro and Maria, marking "OJO" (Look!) in the margins of the three
statements that Carvajal had recorded. Two days later, on October 14,
Villag6mez urged the ecclesiastical judge to deny Pedro's claim. He
wrote:
There can be no basis for the said annulment given the
information received upon issuing the marriage petition.
We find that the couple indulged in illicit cohabitation,
according to three witnesses. It is not possible that in this
state, the said petitioner Pedro Ramirez could ignore the
calidad and condition of the said Maria Josefa, with
whom he intended to contract marriage. Neither can it be
presumed that when both parties attempted to contract
marriage in secret, coming to the Patio de los Naranjos so
as not to attract the attention of dofla Beatriz that both
parties were not acting in concert. By these terms and
having expressed the presumption in favor of marriage,
we ask your merciful Honor to deny this petition for
annulment of the holy matrimonial state.82
Pedro's reaction to Villag6mez was swift and indignant. Throughout the
preceding five months, Pedro had steadily built up his case of fraud. He
had overcome the hurdles raised by Maria Josefa, but unfortunately, Pedro
fell into a trap of his own making. At this point, the problem became one
of complicity in prenuptial fornication with three divergent views on the
matter. Villag6mez was clearly convinced that prenuptial fornication had
preceded the marriage and thus justified the union. Somewhat predictably,
Pedro denied the prenuptial fornication, and claimed he had no knowledge
that the witnesses had made allegations of that nature in their statements.
This denial is implausible, since the three witnesses testified on the same
day that Pedro declared his intention to marry Maria Josefa. But in
denying the fornication he was then guilty of complicity on the marriage
petition-pointing to a premeditated attempt to conceal the marriage from
dofia Beatriz. Presumably, he would not have gone to such lengths to
conceal the marriage, or deliberately lie about his carnal sins if he were in
82. Digo que se ha de declarar no haber lugar la dicha nulidad por la infornaci6n que se hizo
para dar la licencia para que los dichos se casasen. Se hallar6 que para haber de dispensar en las
amonestaciones dicen los testigos que estaban dichos contrayentes en amistad ilicita= y no es
verosimil que estando en ella ygnorase el dicho Pedro Ramirez la calidady condici6n de persona de
la dicha Maria Josefa con quien trat6 de contraer matrimonio=ni es de entender que la diligencia de
venirse a que en el Patio de los Naranjos se le recibiese el conocimiento para efectuar dicho
matrimonio no fue cautelosa de ambas pares procurando que Doha Beatriz de Tovar, ama de la
dicha Maria Josefa no procurase impedirlo = en cuyos tgrmninos y abiendo por expresado lo que puede
favorecer la causa matrimonial a Vmd. pido y suplico no aber lugar la dicha nulidad de matrimonio.
AAL, supra note 1, Exp. 50.
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fact unaware of Maria Josefa's relationship to dofia Beatriz. Neither would
he have requested the exemption if it were not to conceal the marriage
from dofia Beatriz (or from someone else). Besides, Pedro's racial fraud
claim was clearly deficient-Pedro listed Maria Josefa as a cuarterona de
parda on the petition. In his response, Pedro conceded that he knew Maria
Josefa was a cuarterona, but insisted that he while he was willing to
descend a notch down the racial scale, he would never have contracted
marriage with a slave.
Once apprised of Villag6mez's judgment, Beatriz was outraged at the
effrontery of those who suggested that carnal sin had occurred under her
roof. She was equally disturbed by those who besmirched Maria Josefa's
virtuous reputation, given that their accusations reflected poorly on the
rectitude of her own tutelage. Dofia Beatriz's indignation resonated in her
statement:
I must formally assure the court that in the custody and
care in which I have raised my said slave she has been a
chaste and modest virgin of honorable upbringing.
Moreover, she has always been extremely virtuous, such
that after I die, she will continue to uphold the customs
and behavior in which she has been raised. Moreover, in
my household, and in my care, nothing so remotely sinful
would have been permitted, let alone imagined.83
Dofia Beatriz was so incensed that the marriage would have been
expedited because of the suggestion of licentious behavior that she, like
Villag6mez, demanded to see the marriage petition. She immediately
disputed its legal validity. Apparently, two of the three witnesses
(identified as espaholes) who attested to the couple's state of carnal sin
(mal amistados) were Maria Josefa's brothers. The third witness, also an
espahol, was Maria Josefa's close cousin. Despite having been asked in
the generales if they had any relation to the parties, the three men
deliberately concealed their fraternal relationship to Maria Josefa. As a
consequence, their perjury invalidated their subsequent statement of the
couple's marital eligibility and illicit concubinage. The fact that the
brothers urged the court to legalize their sister's profligacy is not
surprising-indeed, as guardians of her honor, they could not be expected
to do otherwise. The problem was that they concealed their relationship to
Maria Josefa, which then compromised the veracity of their testimony.
Pedro was jubilant upon hearing Beatriz's revelation. Again, Pedro
83. Asifornalmente puedo y devo asegurar queen la custodia que he tenido y criado de la dicha
mi esclava ha sido no solo de doncella sino es de virtud exemplar con tnimo de disponer de ella
despugs de mis dias en laforma quepuediese conserbarla en el buen ejemplo en que se ha criado....
Adem6s de que en mi recogimiento, casa y obligaci6n, nunca pudiese caber semejante pecado, y no
solo permitirlo mas nipensarlo. AAL, supra note 1, Exp. 51.
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claimed ignorance of the fraternal relationship of the three witnesses to
Maria Josefa. In his rejoinder to Villag6mez, he pointed out
sanctimoniously (and somewhat redundantly) that the solemnity of the
marital contract demanded the utmost respect and honesty on the part of
all involved. He then reiterated his earlier denial regarding the illicit
fornication, now fortified by dofia Beatriz's assertions of the moral
rectitude of her charge. Indeed, he claimed that he could not even speak
with Maria Josefa alone, given Beatriz's vigilant watch. This decorum
was not evident in Pedro's earlier statements for justifying his failure to
notice that Maria Josefa was in Beatriz's thrall. As he claimed then, Maria
Josefa was able to come and go as she wished during their courtship with
absolutely no objection from Beatriz: totalmente con las acciones de libre
salia todas las veces que se ofrecia sinque la dicha doha Beatriz diese una
palabra sola en contrario.84 Notwithstanding these disclosures, Pedro
remained silent about why he requested the exemption to expedite the
marriage and why he named these three men as witnesses in the first place.
In general, only close friends who could attest to the eligibility of the
couple to contract marriage were called upon to testify-it was an honor
and a demonstration of friendship to serve as someone's witness.85 We can
only conclude that Pedro had no reputable witnesses or longstanding
friends of his own to testify on his behalf.
And what of Maria Josefa's role in the subterfuge? Clearly, she was not
ignorant of her brothers' perjury and may have played an active role along
with her mother in crafting their testimony. Maria Josefa's motivations are
probably the hardest to decipher in this murky case of marital fraud.86
Very early on in the proceedings, although she insisted on the validity of
their marriage, she expressed regret over the ruptured relationship with
84. AAL, supra note 1, Exp. 10.
85. See AGUILAR, supra note 9; HERMAN BENNETT, AFRICANS IN COLONIAL MEXICO:
ABSOLUTISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND AFRO-CREOLE CONSCIOUSNESS 79-125 (2003).
86. Many of these cases emerged at the moment of separation, when the husband attempted to
establish an independent household with his wife. As Saundra Lauderdale Graham reminds us, the
dynamics of domestic servitude simultaneously encompassed obedience, violence, and protection. See
SAUNDRA LAUDERDALE GRAHAM, HOUSE AND STREET: THE DOMESTIC WORLD OF SERVANTS AND
MASTERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY RIO DE JANEIRO (1988). The husbands' demands for
independence and separation expose the co-dependency of the master-slave relationship. Marital
alliances-particularly newly formed ones-disturbed the household rhythms established over decades
between slaves and owners. In their responses, wives either resisted the move or were inscrutably
silent about it. Their silence is in marked distinction with those cases in which wives actively sought
injunctions against their owners for denying their conjugal rights. See McKinley, supra note 5. In
these annulment cases, the wives expressed no interest in moving, no doubt to avoid alienating or
infuriating their owners, or perhaps astutely realizing that the contested marriage was not their conduit
to freedom. Owners and husbands recruited the courts (albeit for different purposes) as a neutral third
party with the power to impose the sought-after domestic arrangement. On the co-implication of
domesticity, gender, and social hierarchy, see Nara Milanich, Whither Family History? A Roadmap
From Latin America, 112 AM. HIST. REV. 439 (2007). For a similar argument in North American
domestic slavery, see SAIDIYA HARTMAN, SCENES OF SUBJECTION: TERROR, SLAVERY, AND SELF-
MAKING IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 80-81 (1997).
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dofia Beatriz. In the April proceedings wherein Pedro sought to assert his
conjugal rights, Maria Josefa alluded to her fine clothing as items that she
had sewn and thus earned: lo cual granjeo y busc6 con mis costuras los
trastos que se han de embarazar.87 Here, it seems that dofia Beatriz
withheld the elaborate clothing that she had formerly bestowed on Maria
Josefa in addition to prohibiting Maria Josefa from leaving her service to
set up a household with Pedro. More importantly, dofia Beatriz refused to
manumit her. For nine months, Maria Josefa was in the unenviable
position of serving two masters: her owner and her husband. Later, she
faced the prospect of being trapped in a marriage in which she was
repudiated by her husband, and chastised by her mistress for foisting
Pedro upon them.
Villag6mez finally called on Maria Josefa on January 8, 1683 (the
following year) to testify. The proceedings had been considerably delayed
because Pedro was unable to answer Villag6mez's interrogatories. At the
end of November, Pedro sent word that he was gravely ill, asking his three
doctors to testify regarding his serious medical condition. When pressed
by Villag6mez, Maria Josefa confessed that no prenuptial fornication had
occurred, and that her brothers had lied in their witness statements. Maria
Josefa echoed the rendition of her circumspect life under Beatriz's
tutelage, saying that her brothers lied about the prenuptial fornication
because of their ardent desire to see her freed through marriage: con el
deseo ardiente de ver remediada dicha hermana suya lo hicieron. On
February 5, 1683 Villag6mez annulled the marriage between Pedro and
Maria, finding that Pedro had proven his case of marital fraud. The
litigation was not cheap: the parties were assigned court costs of 2,074
reales8 The hefty litigation fees raise the presumption in Pedro's favor
that he would not be prepared to expend that much money if he were not
convinced of his right to prevail in this case. But it appears that Pedro did
not live to relish his legal victory. Pedro never recovered from his illness
and died before hearing the final judgment. And thus, the archived record
ends with a petition from Maria Josefa four years later on November 28,
87. AAL, supra note 1, Exp. 9.
88. Over half of these costs were aranceles (notarial fees). Not surprisingly for a heavily
regulated profession, notarial services were rigorously monitored. According to Diego de Ribera,
notaries could charge four reales for personal service, three reales for each Auto, three reales for
drafting each interrogatory, and two reales for each witness examination (three reales if the witness's
testimony went on for more than a page). See DIEGO DE RIBERA, BERNARDO DE OLMEDILLA, VIUDA
DE ALONSO MARTiN DE BALBOA, PRIMERA [SEGUNDA Y TERCERA] PARTE DE ESCRITURAS, Y ORDEN
DE PARTICI6N Y CUENTA, Y DE RESIDENCIA JUDICIAL, CIUIL, Y CRIMINAL, CON UNA INSTRUCCION A
LOS ESCRIUANOS DEL REYNO AL PRINCIPIO, Y ARANZEL 105-11 (Madrid, 1617); see also ARANZEL DE
DERECHOS ECLESIASTICOS PARROQUIALES, DE HOSPITALES, CURIA ECLESIASTICA, Y SECRETARIA DE
CAARA DEL OBISPADO DEL Cuzco (1782). Although writing in 1860 (two centuries after Pedro and
Maria's lawsuit), Manuel Atanasio Fuentes recorded virtually the same prices for notarial fees in Lima.
See CESAR PORCARI, LA CIUDAD DE LOS REYES Y LA "GUIA DEL VIAJERO EN LIMA" DE MANUEL
ATANASIO FUENTES 70-72 (1998).
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1687. In that petition, Maria Josefa requested the original carta de libertad
that belonged to her mother, Juana, which had been submitted by the late
Pedro Ramirez in her annulment proceeding.
PART FIVE: ON WIVES, TERMITES, AND WIDGETS
It is at once challenging and frustrating to subject lawsuits to
retrospective analysis, and particularly so in the case of fraud. Perhaps in
recognition of our human frailties, the law establishes some guidelines for
transacting parties with regard to disclosure, misrepresentation, and due
diligence. Classic treatises and formalist approaches hold that failure to
disclose information that is calculated to deceive the other party will
invalidate a contract on equitable grounds.8 9 But even under the strict
individualist logic of caveat emptor (a potentially harsh doctrine for the
gullible, lazy, or unsophisticated), the contracting party must also exercise
a diligent effort to discover any flaws or imperfections in order to mitigate
his risks.9" In a transaction as binding as marriage, the contracting party
should assume the responsibility of ascertaining the virtue, reputation, or
status of the woman whom he intends to marry if this is indeed important
to him, as a precaution against conniving and unscrupulous brides. 9' One
could reasonably argue here that the doctrine of caveat emptor is an
inappropriate one to analogize Pedro's legal claim-after all, wives are
neither the proverbial termites nor widgets. I am nonetheless persuaded to
apply the doctrine to this case because Pedro alleged that Maria Josefa
willfully misrepresented a material fact for her personal gain.92
Interpreting willful misrepresentation is a perilous task in the case of
status concealment or racial fraud, because so much depended precisely on
what Pedro should have known or tried to discover according to the racial
logics of the time. Short of protections for the "feeble-minded," courts do
not look kindly on those who are deliberately foolish or reckless and then
seek legal redress for their "blind credulity."93 In this regard, we presume
that if Pedro were as concerned as he subsequently claimed to be about the
purity of his lineage, he would have been more careful to investigate
89. See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817).
90. The contemporary law of contract and tort is less tolerant of the harsh individualism of caveat
emptor. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Moves in Contract and Tort Law with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982)
(setting out the formalist view of contracts vis-A-vis the "altruistic" view of caveat emptor).
91. See Shnchez, supra note 23.
92. Whether she gained anything from the marriage remains a mystery. There is no record of dofta
Beatriz's last will and testament in the Archbishopric Archive, and no carta de libertad exists for
Maria Josefa in the notarial documents in the National Archive. I speculate-with a heavy dose of
fantasy and solidarity with Maria Josefa-that maybe in the fateful earthquakes of 1687 that wracked
the city of Lima, she was able to win her freedom. But for now, the records are silent and her freedom
remains unknown.
93. Ayliffe, supra note 50.
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Maria Josefa's background, particularly in marriage negotiations with a
mulata mother. In Villag6mez's mind, what Pedro should have known
was a straightforward, commonsensical matter-not unlike a prudent
homebuyer inspecting for termites. In Pedro's mind, common sense failed
because Maria Josefa defied the racial logics of the period. In terms of
dress, appearance, and adornment, Maria Josefa visually communicated an
identity that was calculated to deceive onlookers-although those who
were close to her knew who and what she was. Even in the most generous
reading of Pedro's efforts, it is unlikely that he was as clueless as he
insisted about Maria Josefa's identity. Maria Josefa never changed her
story. Pedro simply never asked. If Pedro had exercised due diligence
and asked, someone would have apprised him of the situation-either out
of envy, malice, or genuine concern for the racial propriety of the union.
In a close-knit neighborhood where Pedro would have been trying to
establish connections, there would have been no shortage of gossiping
tongues. Maria Josefa was not the newcomer in the parish-she could not
assume a new racial identity or reinvent her status like Juana de Torres-a
recent arrival from Panama. The neighbors certainly stated their
disapproval of what they agreed was racial subterfuge in their statements
to the court. Granted, when pressed by administrative authorities, people
tend to give responses that echo or conform to official mandates about
socially respectable behavior, and so some skepticism is warranted in
reading through these interrogatories. Nonetheless, the witnesses made
remarks about Beatriz's favorable treatment of Maria Josefa that revealed
envy, disapproval and animosity, and granted Pedro a great deal of latitude
in bringing the lawsuit. As mentioned earlier, the neighbors might not
have had much invested in Pedro, but they ultimately expressed an
investment in the racial hierarchy of a slave society and sought to restore
the order disrupted by the relationship between dofia Beatriz and Maria
Josefa.94
If anyone violated the racial order, it was dofia Beatriz in her treatment
of Maria Josefa. I do not pretend that the relationship between Beatriz and
Maria Josefa was completely harmonious or altruistic, or that power was
equally distributed between both women. Such claims would be untenable
and totally unsupported by the record. Beatriz countered Pedro's domestic
plans with the language of her property rights in Maria Josefa. The
distances between them were clearly marked: Beatriz was white,
propertied, and fully endowed with the "honor" code of Spanish colonial
society.95 Maria Josefa was enslaved, illegitimate, and without honor.
94. On the distinction between a society with slaves and a slaveholding society, see SLAVE
CULTURES AND THE CULTURES OF SLAVERY (Stephan Palmi6 ed., 1995).
95. See generally HONOR, STATUS AND LAW IN MODERN LATIN AMERICA (Sueann Caulfield,
Sarah Chambers & Laura Putnam eds., 2005).
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Beatriz allowed Pedro and Maria Josefa to live with her, but it was clearly
under her terms. But her insistent need for Maria Josefa to serve her rings
somewhat hollow, given that Beatriz had at least two other domestic
slaves in her household (one was another of Juana's daughters who was
not as favored as Maria Josefa). It is true that slaves were status symbols
for the Limehio elite, but Beatriz's rectitude is somewhat incongruent with
the ostentatious displays of a vain, frivolous Limefia aristocrat.96 The
relationship exhibited more complexities than the conventional
dichotomies of the master and slave. Can we explain Beatriz's actions
without accounting for emotions like maternal love, or even jealousy?
Was Beatriz competing with Juana-Maria Josefa's biological mother and
Beatriz's former slave-for Maria Josefa's filial loyalties? Or in a society
in which, ultimately, people were held as property, would Beatriz have
been prepared to act as a calculating owner willing to re-sell or rent out
Maria Josefa if her financial exigencies so required?
I reiterate that it is risky for us to delve too deeply into motivation,
because the record does not allow much beyond speculation. The
annulment suits brought by Juan Gonzalez de Miranda and Pascual de
Duefias were easily disposed of, even though all these plaintiffs alleged
marital fraud, and were indeed married to enslaved women. Pedro endured
three denials before prevailing in his case. Villag6mez was only willing to
extinguish the marital bond when Maria Josefa confessed that she lied
about the prenuptial fornication that had convinced Villag6mez's court to
expedite the couple's marriage petition. Ecclesiastical courts, like any
administrative agency, ought to adhere strictly to procedure. The
Archbishopric's court was particularly important in the bureaucratic
objectives of the viceroyalty: court personnel were expected to be
judicious letrados and men of the cloth. Villag6mez's family credentials
were impeccable; his connections to the highest ranks of vice-regal and
ecclesiastical administration were unimpeachable. Villag6mez himself
was an unwavering, high-profile, passionate proponent of the moral
authority of the Archbishopric.97 When plaintiffs proved a procedural
defect, or if the judge discovered that petitioners are "working the system"
to circumvent procedures that should have been strictly upheld, the
petitioners generally prevailed in their cases. Here, the Court's lax
observance of Tridentine procedure was the decisive factor in the
outcome.
This does not mean that the Court did not endorse the ideas of racial
hierarchy that Pedro proclaimed in the proceedings. Clearly, status, class
96. Beatriz was not an aristocrat, although she hailed from a wealthy family with enough financial
assets to own a coach.
97. See MILLS, supra note 60, at chs. 3 & 6.
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and gendered hierarchies shaped the topography of colonial Lima, and
enslaved women were not immune from these considerations when they
came before the Court. But the Court was not in the business of policing
racial fraud-that was left to the community. The Archbishopric court was
a high volume court in which hundreds of less powerful litigants-of
whom many were slaves-sought intervention in their marital affairs.
Villag6mez was concerned with upholding the overall mission of the
Court, which was to preserve the sanctity of marriage.
In sum, there is more to these cases than the recondite record will ever
reveal. The interesting aspect of these error de persona cases is their very
possibility-they depict the mobility of the racial landscape in which
owners, slaves, freedmen, and Spaniards lived. Maria Josefa was literally
an embodied contradiction: she was living proof of the unsustainable
nature of racial boundaries. We will never know what Pedro really knew
about Maria Josefa. All we know is that multiple outcomes were possible
from this web of contested intimacies as women like Maria Josefa
navigated between marriage and slavery in their pursuit of freedom.
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